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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue 1: Is the order from which the petition is brought subject to direct appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78B-11-129 or, does it otherwise constitute a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal? 
Standard of Review: The interpretation of a statute is a question of law. 
State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, If 8, 217 P.3d 265. 
Preservation: This issue was raised by this Court in its Order of March 2, 
2011, provisionally granting the petition for interlocutory appeal. 
Issue 2: Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the order pursuant to Rule 5 
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure? 
Standard of Review: "[T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a 
question of law." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ^  15, 16 P.3d 540. 
Preservation: This issue was raised by this Court in its Order of March 2, 
2011, provisionally granting the petition for interlocutory appeal. 
Issue 3: Did the District Court err in ruling that an undisclosed first-cousin 
relationship between Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge, without more, required 
vacatur of the arbitration award? 
Standard of Review: The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, % 17, 977 P.2d 
1201. 
Preservation: This issue was raised and addressed below in the parties' 
briefing at R. 5830-5909, 5916-5982, 6013-6076, and in the trial court's memorandum 
decision and order (Exh. 1). 
Issue 4: Did the District Court err in failing to deny Westgate's motion to vacate 
on grounds of waiver? 
Standard of Review: Questions of whether waiver has occurred when 
facts are not in material dispute are questions of law. B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. v. 
Collins Food Service, Inc., 754 P. 2d 99, 101 and Note 1 (Utah Ct. App 1988). Questions 
of law are reviewed for correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, If 17, 977 
P.2dl201. 
Preservation: This issue was raised and addressed below in the parties' 
briefing at R. 5916-5982, 6013-6076, and in the trial court's memorandum decision and 
order (Exh. l ,p. 8). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113. Disclosure by arbitrator. 
(1) Before accepting appointment, an individual who is requested to serve as an 
arbitrator, after making a reasonable inquiry, shall disclose to all parties to the 
agreement to arbitrate and arbitration proceeding and to any other arbitrators any 
known facts that a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the 
impartiality of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, including: 
(a) a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; 
and 
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(b) an existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the agreement to 
arbitrate or the arbitration proceeding, their counsel or representatives, a witness, 
or another arbitrator. 
(2) An arbitrator has a continuing obligation to disclose to all parties to the 
agreement to arbitrate and arbitration proceeding and to any other arbitrators any 
facts that the arbitrator leams after accepting appointment which a reasonable 
person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator. 
(3) If an arbitrator discloses a fact required by Subsection (1) or (2) to be 
disclosed and a party timely objects to the appointment or continued service of the 
arbitrator based upon the fact disclosed, the objection may be a ground under 
Subsection 78B-1 l-124(l)(b) for vacating an award made by the arbitrator. 
(4) If the arbitrator did not disclose a fact as required by Subsection (1) or (2), 
upon timely objection by a party, the court under Subsection 78B-ll-124(l)(b) 
may vacate an award. 
(5) An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator who does not disclose a 
known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding or 
a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party is presumed to act with 
evident partiality under Subsection 78B-1 l-124(l)(b). 
(6) If the parties to an arbitration proceeding agree to the procedures of an 
arbitration organization or any other procedures for challenges to arbitrators before 
an award is made, substantial compliance with those procedures is a condition 
precedent to a motion to vacate an award on that ground under Subsection 78B-
ll-124(l)(b). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124. Vacating an award. 
(1) Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the court 
shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if: 
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; 
(b) there was: 
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator; 
(ii) corruption by an arbitrator; or 
(iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the 
arbitration proceeding; 
(c) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient 
cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, 
or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78B-11-116, so as to 
substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; 
(d) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority; 
(e) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the 
arbitration proceeding without raising an objection under Subsection 78B-11-
116(3) not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or 
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(f) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an 
arbitration as required in Section 78B-11-110 so as to substantially prejudice the 
rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding. 
(2) A motion under this section must be filed within 90 days after the movant 
receives notice of the award pursuant to Section 78B-11-120 or within 90 days 
after the movant receives notice of a modified or corrected award pursuant to 
Section 78B-11-121, unless the movant alleges that the award was procured by 
corruption, fraud, or other undue means, in which case the motion must be made 
within 90 days after the ground is known or by the exercise of reasonable care 
would have been known by the movant. 
(3) If the court vacates an award on a ground other than that set forth in 
Subsection (l)(e), it may order a rehearing. If the award is vacated on a ground 
stated in Subsection (l)(a) or (b), the rehearing must be before a new arbitrator. If 
the award is vacated on a ground stated in Subsection (l)(c), (d), or (f), the 
rehearing may be before the arbitrator who made the award or the arbitrator's 
successor. The arbitrator must render the decision in the rehearing within the same 
time as that provided in Subsection 78B-11-120(2) for an award. 
(4) If the court denies a motion to vacate an award, it shall confirm the award 
unless a motion to modify or correct the award is pending. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129. Appeals. 
(1) An appeal may be taken from: 
(a) an order denying a motion to compel arbitration; 
(b) an order granting a motion to stay arbitration; 
(c) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award; 
(d) an order modifying or correcting an award; 
(e) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or 
(f) a final judgment entered pursuant to this chapter. 
(2) An appeal under this section must be taken as from an order or a judgment 
in a civil action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
Westgate filed its initial lawsuit in this case on September 19, 2002. (R. 0011.) In 
March 2004, CPG was granted leave to and did file a counterclaim asserting, inter alia, 
claims against Westgate under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (UPUAA). (R. 
2755.) 
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Four years later, approximately three months before the UPUAA claims were to 
be tried, Westgate filed a motion to compel arbitration of the claims by virtue of a 
provision of the UPUAA stating that such claims are "subject to" arbitration. (R. 3057.) 
Over CPG's objection, on October 27, 2008, the trial court granted Westgate's motion, 
and ordered the UPUAA claims into arbitration. (R. 4718.) 
The trial court's order specified a procedure regarding selection of arbitrators (R. 
4718), which the parties followed: Each party first selected an arbitrator. Westgate 
selected Judith M. Billings, CPG selected Richard D. (Dick) Burbidge, and the two of 
them then selected Paul S. Felt as the neutral. Those three arbitrators comprised the 
"Panel." (R. 5954.) 
After the appointments, Westgate sent an ex parte communication with material to 
its designee. (R. 5922-5924.) Upon learning about it, CPG objected to such ex parte 
communications, arguing that communications from parties should be shared with 
counsel and all arbitrators. Id. 
The Panel, meanwhile, proceeded with the arbitration. On February 20, 2009, the 
Panel issued a Pre-Arbitration Order and Hearing Notice, ordering the parties to perform 
a number of actions prior to, and to appear at, a pre-arbitration hearing to be held March 
27, 2009. (R. 5955.) At the March hearing, the Panel presented for signature an 
"Arbitration Fee Agreement," which included a provision stating that all arbitrators 
considered themselves neutral. (R. 5831.) 
After a year of discovery and various motions, the arbitration hearing took place 
December 7-11, 2009, and January 22, 2010. 
On February 2, 2010, the Panel issued unanimous Findings of Facts, Conclusions 
of Law and Award ("Arbitration Award"). (R. 5935-5947.) The Panel found by clear 
and convincing evidence that Westgate had made false and fraudulent representations, 
and non-disclosures with the intent to mislead or with reckless indifference to the truth. 
(R. 5942, H 10, R. 5939, % 23.) The Panel also found that the actions of Westgate 
constituted a scheme or artifice to defraud within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1801, and that the scheme constituted a pattern of unlawful activity within the 
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602. (R. 5942, 10, R. 5941,lj 15.) 
The Panel awarded $65,500 on the UPUAA claims. (R. 5937.) CPG then 
submitted a motion for attorney fees pursuant to UPUAA, and a motion in the District 
Court to confirm the first arbitration award and certify it as final under U.R.Civ.P. 54(b). 
(R. 5797.) Westgate moved to vacate the award. (R. 5909.) 
Westgate's sole objection to the award was that arbitrator Richard Burbidge had 
failed to disclose that he is one of 22 first cousins of George W. Burbidge II, a 
shareholder at Christensen & Jensen, the law firm representing CPG. Westgate's 
principal argument was that, although Arbitrator Burbidge was a party appointee, by 
voluntarily considering himself "neutral" after his appointment, he had subjected himself 
to disclosure requirements applicable to arbitrators designated as neutral by statute. (R. 
5984-5903.) 
Westgate did not claim to have any evidence of actual impropriety by Richard 
Burbidge, and the evidence was uncontested that Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge 
have no personal or social relationship. 
CPG argued that voluntary and/or unilateral characterizations after appointment do 
not affect the status of party-appointed arbitrators nor the applicable disclosure standards, 
but that, in any event, the mere existence of a first-cousin relationship without more was 
insufficient to vacate an award on non-disclosure grounds. Additionally, CPG argued 
that Westgate waived its right to seek recusal through its delay in raising its objection 
until after the Panel issued its award against Westgate. (R. 5961-5978.) 
On December 13, 2010, the District Court entered an order vacating the arbitration 
award. The court ruled that the first-cousin relationship in itself was a fact that Richard 
Burbidge was required to disclose, because a reasonable person would consider that fact 
likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator. (Exh. 1, pp. 7-8.) The Trial Court 
concluded that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-ll-113(l)(b) mandated disclosure, and that 
evident partiality was presumed under § 78B-11-113(5). The Court vacated the 
arbitration award under § 78B-ll-124(l)(b)(i) and (iii). Id. at 8. Because the trial court 
vacated the award, CPG's motion to confirm was rendered moot. As acknowledged by 
all parties, under the trial court's order, the matter in arbitration is to be reheard by a new 
panel of arbitrators. (See pp. 13-14, infra.) 
CPG petitioned for permission to appeal from the trial court's order on December 
22, 2010. The Court granted the petition provisionally, directing the parties to address 
two threshold issues in connection with briefing on the merits, 1) whether the order from 
which the petition is brought is subject to direct appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78B-11-129 or otherwise constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal; and 2) 
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whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the order pursuant to Rule 5 of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Facts 
The following facts were uncontroverted below (R. 5979-5980; see also R. 5982 
(CPG's Opposition to Westgate's Motion to Vacate), and R. 6076 (Westgate's Reply)): 
Richard D. Burbidge is a first cousin of George W. Burbidge II, one 
of 22 first cousins. 
[George W. Burbidge is] a shareholder in Christensen & Jensen. 
Due to a large disparity in ages between their fathers, Richard D. 
Burbidge is a generation older than George W. Burbidge. (Richard D. 
Burbidge is 61 years old; George W. Burbidge II is 42.) 
Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge have no close familial 
relationship, have no active social relationship, do not speak with each 
other regularly, have no business relationship with each other, and have no 
personal connection outside their familial relationship. They have not 
spoken in many months. They last spoke for a minute when they happened 
to bump into each other during the Utah Bar Convention in Sun Valley, 
Idaho, in June, 2009. Previously, they both attended the funeral of an aunt 
in March, 2009. 
The law firms at which Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge are 
associated have been adverse to each other in litigation, and Richard 
Burbidge and George Burbidge have been adverse to each other in 
litigation. 
George Burbidge has had no involvement in the Westgate case. His 
financial interest in any recovery by other shareholders in the firm is 
indirect. 
George Burbidge has never asked for, discussed, received, or 
expected in any way any financial support or benefit from any of his 22 
first cousins, including Richard Burbidge. The notion that Richard 
Burbidge would be influenced by an indirect interest in facilitating George 
Burbidge's indirect interest in a recovery, or vice versa, is unreasonable. 
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Westgate does not claim that any actual conflict existed on the part of Richard D. 
Burbidge, or that he evidenced any partiality in the proceedings.1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's order is not subject to immediate appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-11-129. None of the grounds specified by statute for such an appeal is 
present: The order did not deny a motion to compel arbitration, did not stay arbitration, 
did not modify or correct an award, and was not a final judgment. While the order 
technically resulted in a denial of confirmation, as the trial court recognized, that was 
solely a result of the order having already been vacated through the granting of 
Westgate's motion - in essence, there was no award to confirm. Under § 129(e), appeal 
from an order of vacatur is expressly not permitted if the vacatur contemplates a 
rehearing, as all parties agree occurred in this case. 
Even if one of the grounds for appeal under § 129 had been present, the statute 
indicates that the taking of such appeal is permissive, rather than mandatory. This Court 
Westgate counsel: "We've never made an accusation that Mr. Burbidge did anything 
untoward in connection with discharging his duties as an arbitrator, other than failing to 
make these disclosures. Again, as the Court pointed out in its synopsis of the - of CPG's 
position, we've never used the undue means or fraud trigger under the - under Section 
125. We've never brought that up. That's not part of it. The only one that we've 
invoked is the evident partiality. That is only because in Section 113 the presumption of 
evident partiality is created by the failure to make that disclosure. So we've never 
professed, and we agreed to this in the reply, that we're making a factual showing that 
Mr. Burbidge engaged in fraud or undue means or there was evident partiality as a matter 
of objective evidence or proof. We've not pointed to anything he said or did during the 
proceedings or anything like that." (Exh. 2, Transcript of Hearing, August 4, 2010, pp. 
30-31.) 
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has consistently recognized a distinction between permissive ("may" appeal) and 
mandatory language ("shall"). Thus, CPG would not have been required to pursue an 
appeal pursuant to § 129; it was permitted to seek review through other permissible 
means, such as a petition for interlocutory review. 
The Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 5; the petition was filed within 20 days of a non-final order. Moreover, even if 
the rules governing the filing of a notice of appeal from a final judgment had been 
applicable, the filing of the Rule 5 petition less than 30 days after entry of the order 
would have had the effect of such a notice under U.R.A.P. 3 and 4. Cedar Surgery 
Center, LLC v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58, ffi[ 10-12, 96 P.3d 91L 
With respect to the merits, the trial court erred in its interpretation of the 
disclosure requirements of the Utah Arbitration Act. Under the Act, "neutral" arbitrators 
are subject to certain disclosure requirements that do not apply to "party" appointees. 
Assuming for purposes of argument that Richard D. Burbidge was a neutral rather than 
party appointee, the trial court erred in two respects: 
First, the court erred in ruling that a first-cousin relationship between an arbitrator 
and an attorney whose firm represents one of the parties - 19 years apart in age, with no 
existing personal, social, or financial relationship - is, without more, a "substantial 
relationship with a party." The trial court's ruling misreads the statute, which requires 
disclosure not of "relationships" but only of "substantial" relationships. 
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Further, even if the genetic relationship alone could be deemed a substantial 
relationship, under the statute, the non-disclosure of such relationship does not mandate 
vacatur, as the trial court "reluctantly" believed. Rather, the statute provides only that 
non-disclosure creates a "presumption" of "evident partiality." There is no indication in 
the statute that the presumption is irrebuttable - indeed, had the legislature so intended, it 
would simply have included non-disclosure to the list of grounds for automatic vacatur. 
In this case, the presumption was uncontrovertibly rebutted: Evidence of the lack 
of any partiality, "evident" or otherwise, and of the lack of any meaningful relationship at 
all, was undisputed. Westgate conceded as much, acknowledging that its sole argument 
for vacatur was that the presumption was irrebuttable. 
The trial court not only erred in interpreting the disclosure standard applicable to 
neutral appointees, but it erred in applying that standard in the first instance, because 
Mr. Burbidge was a party appointee, not a neutral appointee. By order of the trial court 
(and custom), each party selected one arbitrator, and those two arbitrators then appointed 
a neutral. Mr. Burbidge was a party appointee, and both the Arbitration Act and case law 
distinguish between such appointees and a designated neutral. The fact that, after the 
arbitration process had already begun, the Panel unilaterally considered themselves 
neutral does not retroactively alter the nature of the appointment. 
As a party appointee, Mr. Burbidge was required to disclose only relationships that 
"a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator . . . 
." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(1) (emphasis added). No such relationship exists here 
between Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge - indeed, their "relationship" is 
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markedly less developed than that between many unrelated attorneys. Moreover, even if 
their relationship was deemed to qualify under Section 113, vacatur was discretionary, 
not mandatory, as the trial court assumed. Under the undisputed facts of this case, 
vacatur would not have been a reasonable exercise of discretion even if the trial court had 
applied the correct standard. 
Finally, the trial court should have considered CPG's argument that Westgate 
waived any right to object to Mr. Burbidge's participation or non-disclosures. Westgate 
itself admits that the only information it needed to discern the familial relationship was, 
literally, staring it in the face: the name of George Burbidge on Christensen & Jensen's 
letterhead. That name was on C & J's letterhead throughout the litigation and, in fact, the 
designation of Richard Burbidge had been submitted to Westgate's counsel on that same 
letterhead two years earlier. Waiver is a permitted argument under the Arbitration Act, 
and includes circumstances in which a party fails to act reasonably after actual or 
constructive knowledge of its grounds. Even assuming that Westgate did fortuitously 
notice George Burbidge's name for the first time shortly after an adverse ruling, the 
information was available to it the whole time. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IS NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO § 129 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT, AND, IN ANY 
EVENT, APPEALS PURSUANT TO § 129 ARE PERMISSIVE, NOT 
MANDATORY. 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-11-129 provides that an appeal may be taken from: "(a) a n 
order denying a motion to compel arbitration; (b) an order granting a motion to stay 
arbitration; (c) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award; (d) an order 
modifying or correcting an award; (e) an order vacating an award without directing a 
rehearing; or (f) a final judgment entered pursuant to this chapter." 
None of the bases for appeal listed in §129 is applicable to this matter. The Ruling 
and subsequent Order did not deny a motion to compel arbitration, stay arbitration, or 
modify or correct the award. The trial court observed that if it granted the motion to 
vacate, it was not required to issue an order confirming the award - there was, in fact, no 
award to confirm. (Exh. 1 at 7.) The trial court then granted Westgate's motion to vacate 
and denied CPG's combined motion to confirm the award and to enter a final order under 
U.R.Civ.P. 54(b). (Id. at 8.) The trial court did not issue a final judgment, and denied 
CPG's motion to certify the Order as final under LLR.Civ.P. 54(b). Id. 
The parties and the trial court agree that the arbitration is to be reheard by a new 
panel unless this Court reverses the trial court's Order. As acknowledged by Westgate in 
its opposition to CPG's petition for interlocutory appeal, "The Order calls for re-
arbitration of the case." Response in Opposition to Petition for Permission to Appeal 
from Interlocutory Appeal at 7; see also id. at 8, 9 ("CPG's right to arbitrate its case in 
front of a neutral and impartial panel is unaffected"), and 10 ("the District Court's Order, 
which in the jargon, ordered a 'do-over'"), and Petition for Permission to Appeal from 
Interlocutory Order, pp. 4, 6, 15 ("Unless interlocutory review is granted, the parties will 
be forced to start over in an arbitration that has already cost hundreds of thousands of 
dollars."); also Exh. 2, Transcript of Hearing p. 34 ("[Westgate counsel]: What the 
statute says, though, is if you do vacate for evident impartiality, you order a rehearing. 
THE COURT: Sure.") Because the trial court and both parties contemplate a rehearing 
of the arbitration, §78B-1 l-129(e) is not applicable. 
The trial court's Order vacating the award appealed from here was not a final 
Order. This Court has made clear that "for an order or judgment to be final, it must 
dispose of the case as to all the parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter of the 
litigation on the merits of the case. In other words, it must end the controversy between 
the litigants, leaving nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Powell v. 
Cannon, 2008 UT 19, T| 11; 179 P. 3d 179 (citations omitted). If the Order is allowed to 
stand, the parties will face a new round of arbitration hearings with a new panel, new 
costs and fees, and a new round of testimony from the witnesses. Therefore none of the 
bases listed in §78B-11-129 is applicable. 
2
 By statute, an order granting vacatur without a rehearing is typically reserved for 
grounds that, by their nature, preclude a subsequent rehearing of the arbitration. See, e.g., 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124(3) ("If the court vacates an award on a ground other than 
that set forth in Subsection (l)(e) [that there was no agreement to arbitrate], it may order 
a rehearing. If the award is vacated on a ground stated in Subsection (l)(a) or (b) 
[evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral], the rehearing must be before a 
new arbitrator." 
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However, even if grounds identified in § 78B-11-129 had been present, an 
immediate appeal under that section is permissive, not mandatory: "(1) A*1 appeal may 
be taken..." §78B-11-129 provides a statutory avenue to appeal non-final orders, but 
does not mandate such appeals nor does it change interlocutory orders of a trial court into 
final orders. This Court and the Court of Appeals have consistently noted that "may" is a 
word of permission, not mandate. See, e.g., In re Olympus Const., L.C., 2009 UT 29, f 
15, 215 P.3d 129 ("[Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-] 1305 (1) provides, CA dissolved company 
in winding up may dispose of the known claims against it by following the procedures 
described in this section.' (Emphasis added [by court].) Use of the provisions of this 
section is permissive rather than mandatory. That is, a dissolved company may elect to 
follow the procedures in this section or it may choose another route."); Diversified 
Holdings, L.C v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, % 32, 63 P.3d 686 ("This use of 'may' is 
permissive, rather than mandatory"); Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230 
(Utah App. 1995) ("[U.R.A.P.] 10(a) provides: 'Within 10 days after the docketing 
statement is served, a party may move: (1) To dismiss the appeal or the petition for 
review on the basis that the appellate court has no jurisdiction.' Utah R. App. P. 10(a) 
(emphasis added [by court]). Rule 10(a) is permissive, not mandatory."); Pugh v. Dozzo-
Hughes, 2005 UT App. 203, ^ 13, 112 P.3d 1247 ("a rule 38 motion to substitute parties 
on appeal is permissive, not mandatory. See Utah R. App. P. 38(a) (stating another 
"party may be substituted as a party" by motion (emphasis added [by court])).")3 
That is only logical: Any other reading would compel an immediate appeal when it 
1<N 
II. THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). Rule 5(a) provides that an appeal from an interlocutory order 
may be sought within 20 days after the entry of the order. U.R.A.P. 5(a). This Court has 
explained that "no finality will be ascribed to a memorandum decision or minute entry for 
purposes of triggering the running of the time for appeal until the prevailing party 
prepares and submits a proposed order." Houghton v. Dept of Health, 2008 UT 86, If 11; 
206 P. 3d 287; citing to Code v. Dept. of Health, 2007 UT 43, ^  9, 162 P.3d 1097. 
In this matter, the trial court issued a Ruling on September 30, 2010, and directed 
Westgate to prepare an order consistent with the opinion. The Order prepared by 
Westgate was signed and entered on December 13, 2010. (Exh. 1.) Because the trial 
court's Order vacating the award while contemplating a rehearing was not appealable, 
CPG filed its Petition for interlocutory appeal on December 22, 2010, well within the 20 
days allotted by Rule 5(a). Therefore the Petition was timely and the Court has 
jurisdiction. 
Even if the Court were to hold that an appeal pursuant to § 7 8B-11-129 is an 
appeal as of right, the Petition for interlocutory appeal was also timely pursuant to Rules 
3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures. In Cedar Surgery Center, LLC. v. 
Bonelli, this Court held that a petition for interlocutory appeal was sufficient to provide 
might not otherwise be necessary or desired, sacrificing judicial economy and potentially 
causing additional delay. For example, a party might choose not to appeal immediately 
an order staying an arbitration if it felt that a resolution of remaining non-arbitrable issues 
would resolve the case more quickly (and/or at less expense). 
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proper notice of appeal when it had been filed within the 30 days mandated by Rule 4a. 
Cedar Surgery Center, LLC v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58,1fi| 10-12; 96 P. 3d 911. Given the 
timing of the petition in Bonelli, this Court concluded it did not need to decide if the 
district court's order was final. Likewise here, if the Court were to decide that an appeal 
in this case pursuant to §78B-11-129 was mandatory the Court should apply the rationale 
of Bonelli that "when determining whether a notice of appeal is sufficient, we look to the 
substance of the notice-not its caption." Id. at J^ 12. 
Applying Bonelli to the situation here is reasonable because a statutory right of 
appeal, as that established in § 78B-11-129, is clearly in addition to an appeal from a final 
order or from an order certified pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedures. In Pledger v. Gillespie, this Court observed that the Utah Arbitration Act 
confers jurisdiction over the enunciated factors "regardless of whether the order is a final 
judgment or has otherwise been designated as final by the district court under Rule 
54(b)." Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54 ^ 17; 982 P. 2d 572. Indeed, when, as here, the 
district court issues an order pursuant to the Utah Arbitration Act vacating a mediation 
award while undoubtedly contemplating a rehearing of the arbitration, that Order is more 
akin to an interlocutory order than either a final order or one certified under Rule 54. 
Although this Court has refused to apply the reasoning of Bonelli in a situation 
where the district court had certified the order as final pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54, thus 
creating a truly final order, the trial court here did not certify its Order pursuant to Rule 
54. See Clark v. Archer, 2010 UT 57; 242 P. 3d 758 (when a judgment is certified as 
final under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an appellant must file an 
I T 
appeal as of right under rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure). In 
Clark v. Archer, the Court explained that "presumptively final judgments provide clear 
direction to an appellant as to the proper procedures to follow under rules 3 and 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." Id at % 13. The district court's Order in this case is 
not a presumptively final judgment; the first and principle ruling of the trial court was 
vacatur, the denial of the other pending motions was an automatic side effect of the 
vacatur. Based upon the trial court's order, § 78B-11-129 does not prescribe the method 
of appeal or give clear direction to appellants. 
Section 78B-11-129(2) provides that "an appeal under this section must be taken 
as from an order or a judgment in a civil action." Of course, orders can be final orders or 
interlocutory in nature, and it is the nature of the order which determines if a party should 
bring an appeal under Rules 3 and 4 or Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
In this matter the district court's order was neither a final order nor one certified pursuant 
to U.R.C.P. 54. Therefore CPG was warranted in bringing its appeal as an interlocutory 
appeal and this Court has jurisdiction. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE DISCLOSURE 
PROVISIONS OF THE ARBITRATION ACT WAS ERRONEOUS. 
More than eight and one half years since litigation began, more than six years 
since Christensen & Jensen made an appearance in the litigation, more than two years 
since arbitration was compelled, and after the expenditure of hundreds of hours of 
attorney time and nearly $150,000 in arbitrator fees alone, the parties face having to re-
arbitrate if the trial court's interpretation of the Arbitration Act is permitted to stand. 
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Moreover, under the trial court's order, all of the work of the prior panel, including 
rulings on numerous motions and discovery disputes, will be of no legal effect and the 
parties will have to begin from scratch.4 
It is because of consequences like this - the antithesis of an expedient and cost-
effective resolution - that the burden for vacating an arbitration award in Utah is steep. 
This Court has explained that "a motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award is 
limited to determining whether any of the very limited grounds for modification or 
vacatur exist." Pacific Development, L.C. v. Orton, 2001 UT 36, ^6, 23 P. 3d 1035 
(citing Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P. 2d 941, 947 (Utah 1996)). 
As discussed infra, CPG takes issue with the trial court's ruling that Richard 
Burbidge was a "neutral" appointee under the Utah Arbitration Act. However, even 
assuming that he was, the trial court erred in two central respects, either of which requires 
reversal. Understanding the nature of the error requires articulation of the relationship 
among the two disclosure provisions in the Act, one of which applies only to neutrals, 
and the other of which applies to both neutral- and party-appointees. As discussed 
herein, the trial court erred under either standard. 
Neutral appointees are subject to a disclosure requirement in the Act that does not 
apply to party appointees. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(5) states that a neutral 
appointee who does not disclose a "known, existing, and substantial relationship with a 
party" is presumed to act with evident partiality: 
Additionally, only portions of the arbitration proceeding were recorded. Consequently, 
several live witnesses will have to be brought in again. 
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An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator who does not disclose a 
known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the arbitration 
proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party is 
presumed to act with evident partiality under Subsection 78B-1 l-124(l)(b). 
Section 78B-1 l-124(l)(b), in turn, provides: 
Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the 
court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if: 
* * * 
(b) there was: 
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a 
neutral arbitrator. 
In interpreting these provisions, the trial court erred in a couple of respects, either 
of which requires reversal. First, it erroneously interpreted "substantial relationship" as 
including first-cousin relationships unaccompanied by any personal, social, or financial 
relationship. Second, it erroneously assumed that the presumption of evident partiality 
was irrebuttable, when all evidence - and Westgate's own concession - was that no 
partiality was evidenced by Arbitrator Burbidge. 
A. Richard Burbidge's first-cousin relationship with George Burbidge, 
without more, was not a "substantial relationship" with a party.5 
The legislature did not define "substantial relationship" within the Arbitration Act, 
and this Court need not do so now. It is enough that the (non)relationship in this case 
does not qualify. From the plain language of the statute, it is self-evident that a 
5
 CPG does not dispute that Richard Burbidge's consanguinity with George Burbidge 
was a "known" and "existing" relationship. Consequently, this discussion focuses on 
whether it satisfied the third element, a "substantial" relationship with a party. 
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"relationship" in itself is insufficient to implicate Section 78B-11-113(5); it must be 
"substantial." 
This Court has warned against interpreting the Arbitration Act so as to impose an 
"appearance of impropriety" standard on arbitrators. In DeVore v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 
884 P.2d 1246, 1255 (Utah 1994), the Court observed: 
[A]s a matter of policy, we think an appearance-of-partiality standard 
sets an impractically low threshold, especially in a small state like Utah. 
Indeed, to disqualify any arbitrator who has professional dealings with 
one of the parties (to say nothing of a social acquaintanceship) would 
make it impossible, in some circumstances, to find a qualified arbitrator 
at all.6 
Similarly, the Utah Ethics Advisory Committee has opined that the participation of 
a cousin may result in judicial disqualification under the (former) general Canon 3C(1) 
impartiality standard only "if a close personal relationship exists'' (R. 5920, Informal 
Opinion No. 89-5 (emphasis added).) The opinion, while not binding on the Court, 
supports the contention that a first-cousin relationship alone is not sufficient for 
disqualification even of a sitting judge - the genetic relationship must be accompanied by 
a personal or social relationship, which all parties agree is not present here. 
In short, being one of 22 cousins, with a 19-year age gap, with virtually no 
personal interaction - in fact, less of a social relationship than many unrelated attorneys -
and no financial connection, cannot reasonably be construed as a "substantial" 
The Court's observation regarding the effect of the size of the legal community and 
jurisdiction is fitting here: Particularly with Utah's large families and unique heritage, it 
would be hard to find a law firm in town that does not have a Christensen, Jensen, Snow, 
Burbidge, etc. 
?1 
relationship. See, e.g., Washburn v. McManus, 895 F. Supp 392, 399 (D. Conn. 1994) 
("The mere fact of a prior relationship is not in and of itself sufficient to disqualify 
arbitrators. The relationship between the arbitrator and the party's principal must be so 
intimate - personally, socially, professionally, or financially - as to cast serious doubt on 
the arbitrator's impartiality"). 
In Morelite Construction Corp. v. NY City District Council Carpenters Benefit 
Fund, 748 F.2d 79 (2nd Cir. 1984), cited approvingly by this Court in DeVore, the 
Second Circuit upheld the disqualification of an arbitrator whose son was president of the 
Union, a district chapter of which was a party to the arbitration. However, the court 
narrowed its ruling and observed that 
[w]e need not, and do not, attempt to set forth a list of familial or other 
relationships that will result in the per se vacation of an arbitration 
award, except to suggest that such a list would most likely be very short. 
We do not intend to hold arbitrators to all the standards of Canon 3. 748 
F.2d at 85. 
The court also predicted post arbitration "sour grapes" by losing parties, stating 
that "[n]either do we intend that unsuccessful parties to arbitration may have awards set 
aside by seeking out and finding tenuous relationships between the arbitrator and the 
successful party." Id. As a California court stated recently, 
[t]he test is an objective one - whether such an impression is created in 
the eye of the hypothetical reasonable person. Thus, unless a reasonable 
member of the public at large, aware of all the facts, would fairly 
entertain doubts concerning the arbitrator's impartiality, the arbitrator is 
not subject to disqualification. 
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Mahnke v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 4th 565, 579, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197, 206 
(2009). In this matter, a reasonable person, aware of the facts, would not fairly entertain 
"7 
doubts regarding the impartiality of Richard Burbidge. 
B. The uncontroverted evidence rebutted the presumption of 
evident partiality in any event. 
Westgate successfully argued below that Richard Burbidge's failure to disclose the 
first-cousin relationship with George Burbidge "is both statutorily presumed to constitute 
evident partiality and is, in fact, evident partiality . . . ." (R. 5909 at 15; also Exh. 2, p. 31 
("It's the presumption, which the statute does not say is rebuttable. . . . We're saying it is, 
you know, an irrebuttable presumption of evident partiality which mandates vacatur here 
under the statute.").) 
But as CPG pointed out, presumptions are just that, presumptions. See, e.g., Exh. 
2, pp. 38-39 (U[A] presumption is always rebuttable unless stated otherwise. Courts often 
refer to it as a balloon. That the balloon is the presumption, and as soon as evidence is 
presented contrary to the presumption, the balloon pops."); U.R.E. 301(1); Burns v. 
Both Westgate and the Trial Court relied on a 1968 U. S. Supreme Court opinion for the 
proposition that arbitrators are required to "disclose to the parties any dealings that might 
create an impression of possible bias." Exh 1 (court's ruling) at 8, quoting 
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).). 
However, this Court not only rejected that standard in DeVore, but expressly found 
reliance upon Commonwealth to be misplaced, noting that the quoted language "captured 
only three other votes," and that one of the concurring justices, "Justice White further 
concluded that an arbitrator cannot be expected to provide the parties with a complete and 
unexpurgated business biography. But it is enough for present purposes to hold, as the 
Court does, that where an arbitrator has a substantial interest in a firm which had done 
more than trivial business with a party, that fact must be disclosed." DeVore, 884 P.2d at 
1255 n. 11 (brackets omitted). 
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Boyden, 2006 UT 14, U 20, 133 P.3d 370; Richard C. Mangrum & Dee V. Benson, 
MANGRUM & BENSON ON UTAH EVIDENCE, at 101-102 (2009-2010 ed.) ("If the basic 
fact is established and evidence is presented challenging the presumed fact, then the 
presumption either disappears . . . or remains to allocate the burden of persuasion as to 
the nonexistence of the presumed fact . . . ."). Contrast with Davis v. Provo City Corp., 
2008 UT 59, ffi[ 22-23, 193 P.3d 86 (applying statute in which legislature used term 
"conclusive presumption" and citing other statutes with that wording). 
Indeed, that the presumption is rebuttable is self-evident in the statute. If the 
legislature had intended a failure to disclose a substantial relationship in itself to mandate 
vacatur, it would simply have listed such failure to disclose as a ground for mandatory 
vacatur under Section 78B-11-124(1), rather than creating a presumption in Section 78B-
11-113(5). 
CPG adduced affirmative, unrefuted evidence rebutting any inference of partiality, 
including the fact that no social, personal, or financial relationship existed, that a material 
difference in age existed, and that the two Burbidges and their firms have been adverse to 
each other in litigation. See pp. 3-4, supra. Moreover, Mr. Burbidge was one of three 
arbitrators, whose decision was unanimous, and who, while affording substantial relief to 
CPG, did reject portions of CPG's claims. {See R. 5947.) 
Once CPG adduced affirmative evidence rebutting the presumption, the burden 
fell upon Westgate to come up with something from which "a reasonable person would 
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conclude that an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality . . . ." DeVore v. 
IHCHospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 1256 (Utah 1994).8 
Westgate adduced no such evidence. In fact, counsel conceded that it had no such 
evidence to offer: "So we've never professed, and we agreed to this in the reply, that 
we're making a factual showing that Mr. Burbidge engaged in fraud or undue means or 
there was evident partiality as a matter of objective evidence or proof We've not pointed 
to anything he said or did during the proceedings or anything like that." (Exh. 2, pp. 30-
31.) (Emphasis added.) 
As a matter of law, therefore, Westgate failed to meet the requirements of vacatur 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124( 1 )(b). The appropriateness of this conclusion is 
illustrated by the Court's application of a similar standard in DeVore. In that case, 
several years before the arbitration, the sole arbitrator (Mabey) had been an LDS stake 
president under whom an adverse witness served as bishop, a relationship that the trial 
court characterized as "significant and important." 
That relationship, without more, was insufficient for a reasonable person to find 
that the arbitrator showed partiality, this Court concluded. "There is no evidence in the 
record that this particular relationship has continued in any substantial way since 1980," 
o 
Applying similar language in the predecessor to § 78B-11-124, the DeVore, this Court 
rejected a standard that would require a party seeking vacatur to prove actual partiality. 
However, the movant must prove that "a reasonable person would conclude that an 
arbitrator, appointed as neutral, showed partiality . . . . Furthermore, the burden of proof 
falls on the movant, and the evidence of partiality must be certain and direct, not remote, 
uncertain, or speculative." DeVore, 884 P.2d at 1256 (emphasis added). There is no 
material difference between the "showed partiality" language construed in DeVore and 
the "evident partiality" language presently utilized in the Act. Id. at 1256 n. 12. 
the Court noted. "Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that Mabey continued 
to be, if indeed he ever was, influenced by his alleged love, respect, and admiration for 
[the witness]. The affidavits submitted by Dr. DeVore contain, at best, remote, uncertain, 
and speculative statements. . . . A reasonable person would not regard them as 
establishing certain and direct evidence for Mabey's allegiance to [the witness] or any 
resultant partiality to IHCH." 884 P.2d at 1257 (emphases added). 
The Court further noted that "[t]here is no evidence in the record that Mabey did 
anything but use his best judgment to decide the issues of fact and law before him. That 
Mabey found IHCH's arguments more persuasive than Dr. DeVore's is not evidence of 
bias. Indeed, neither an arbitrator's consistent reliance on the winning party's evidence 
nor the arbitrator's conclusion in the winning party's favor establish partiality." Id. at 
1257. In this case, the trial court erred in assuming that a presumption of evident 
partiality would in itself compel mandatory vacatur, and in failing to recognize that the 
presumption had been rebutted by the uncontroverted evidence. 
C. Although the arbitrators all considered themselves neutral and 
conducted themselves accordingly after their appointment, Mr. 
Burbidge was not a "neutral" appointee under the Arbitration 
Act. 
Westgate argued that all three arbitrators in this matter were statutorily neutral, 
and the trial court considered Richard Burbidge as a "neutral" arbitrator under the statute. 
(Exh. 1, pp. 3, 8.) It is true that the Panel members decided after their appointment to 
consider themselves neutral, and conducted the proceeding accordingly. They then stated 
their understanding in an "Arbitration Fee Agreement" which the parties signed. 
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A post-appointment decision by arbitrators cannot retroactively transform the 
nature of their earlier appointment into the appointment of three statutory "neutrals" 
under the Utah Arbitration Act. Indeed, Westgate's choice to forward copies of various 
court pleadings ex parte to "its" arbitrator contradicts the argument that it considered its 
chosen arbitrator, Judith Billings, to have been a "neutral" appointee. 
The appointees in this matter acted in an objective, professional manner 
throughout the arbitration and, as discussed above, the same result would obtain 
regardless of whether the standards for "neutrals" applied to all three arbitrators. 
However, the trial court's failure to address the legal distinction between a party-
appointed arbitrator and an arbitrator-appointed arbitrator was error. 
As ordered by the trial court in its Order Regarding Westgate Resorts LTD's 
Motion to Compel Arbitration (R. 4714), the process utilized in appointing arbitrators in 
this case is familiar to anyone who litigates in Utah: each party appointed an arbitrator, 
and those two arbitrators appointed a neutral. In practice, attorneys are trained to be, and 
generally are, objective in their assessments of facts and law. Nonetheless, party-
appointees are not "neutral" appointees under the Arbitration Act, and no party could 
reasonably claim otherwise. 
The Utah Code indirectly recognizes different roles for party-selected arbitrators 
and for 'neutral' arbitrators. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-11-112(2); 78B-11-
113(5); 78B-11-124. Other courts have similarly recognized that subjecting party-
selected arbitrators to the same disclosures and disqualification requirements is 
inconsistent with legislation recognizing the different roles. See, e.g., Mahnke v. 
Superior Court, supra at 577-578; Washburn v. McManus, supra at 399 (some 
subjectiveness is tolerated and even expected from party-selected arbitrators); Daiichi 
Hawaii Real Estate Corp. v. Lichter, 82 P. 3d 411, 428 (Hawaii 2003) ("it stands to 
intuitive reason that a party-appointed arbitrator might view the proceeding through a 
more subjective and partial lens than a neutral arbitrator"); Astoria Med. Group, v. Health 
Ins. Plan Greater NY, 182 N.E. 2d 85, 88 (1962) ("the very reason each of the parties 
contract for the choice of his own arbitrator is to make certain that his 'side' will, in a 
sense, be represented on the tribunal"); Aetna Gas & Sur. Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A. 2d 88, 
92 (R.I. 1991) ("it would be inappropriate to require the party-appointed arbitrators to 
adhere to the same standard of neutrality as a judge. That standard ignores the practical 
realities of arbitration panels composed of party-appointed arbitrators"). 
As appointees whom the parties had not designated as neutral prior to their 
appointment, Richard Burbidge and Judith Billings were subject to the general disclosure 
requirements of Section 78B-11-113(1), not the neutral-specific requirements of Section 
78B-11-113(5) to which Paul S. Felt, the neutral choice of the other arbitrators, was 
subject. Accordingly, no presumption of evident partiality ever arose, and the trial court 
erred in vacating the award based upon such a presumption. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT A NON-
DISCLOSURE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-11-113(1) HAD 
OCCURRED, AND THAT ANY SUCH NON-DISCLOSURE WOULD 
MANDATE VACATUR. 
If, as CPG contends, Section 78B-11-113(5) has no bearing on this case, that 
leaves only one additional provision of the Utah Arbitration Act in play. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-11-113(1) is a general disclosure requirement that applies to all arbitrators, 
whether party-appointed or neutral. Because this standard encompasses arbitrators 
known to be non-neutral, it imposes a lower standard for disclosure than that for neutrals: 
[78B-11-113(1)] Before accepting appointment, an individual who is 
requested to serve as an arbitrator, after making a reasonable inquiry, shall 
disclose to all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration 
proceeding and to any other arbitrators any known facts that a reasonable 
person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator in 
the arbitration proceeding, including: 
(b) an existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the 
agreement to arbitrate or the arbitration proceeding, their counsel or 
representatives, a witness, or another arbitrator. 
This provision does not require disclosure of a relationship at all unless "a 
reasonable person would consider [the relationship] likely to affect the impartiality of 
the arbitrator . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, even if such relationship is found, it 
does not mandate vacatur, as the lower court held; failure to disclose under § 78B-11-
113(1) leaves vacatur to the court's discretion: 
[§ 78B-11-113(4)] If the arbitrator did not disclose a fact as required by 
Subsection (1) or (2), upon timely objection by a party, the court under 
Subsection 78B-1 l-124(l)(b) may vacate an award. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In citing Section 78B-11-113 as a basis for vacatur, the trial court erred in two 
respects: First, for the reasons discussed above, CPG submits that no reasonable person 
would conclude that the relationship at issue in this case was "likely" to affect Arbitrator 
Burbidge's impartiality. The "any known facts that a reasonable person would consider" 
on 
must include not only the consanguine connection, but also the remote, nearly non-
existent nature of the rapport between the arbitrator and his detached cousin. The statute 
places the duty to evaluate all the facts surrounding the situation on "an arbitrator, after 
making a reasonable inquiry." Therefore, the arbitrator must evaluate not just the first 
cousin connection in a vacuum, but all the facts associated with that connection. To 
insist that Arbitrator Burbidge erred when he did not disclose his flimsy link to George 
Burbidge strips the statute of its clear meaning. 
Second, even if a reasonable person could find such likelihood, it does not 
mandate vacatur, as the trial court ("reluctantly") believed; rather, the issue is subject to 
the exercise of sound discretion. Because CPG adduced uncontroverted evidence that 
there was no tie between the Burbidges beyond shared ancestors, it would have been an 
abuse of discretion for the trial court to vacate the award under the standard applicable to 
party appointees. Consequently, it is appropriate on these undisputed facts for the Court 
to remand with directions to enter judgment in favor of CPG. 
V. WESTGATE WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO OBJECT TO ARBITRATOR 
BURBIDGES PARTICIPATION. 
As noted above, CPG argued that Westgate had waived any right to object to 
arbitrator Burbidge's participation or the alleged non-disclosure. CPG argued that 
Westgate failed to raise an objection within a reasonable period after it knew or should 
have known of the grounds for the objection. CPG also argued that the court should 
1 0 
consider the arguably less-than-coincidental timing of the motion, i.e., shortly after an 
unfavorable ruling was issued, a year and a half into the arbitration. (R. 5977.) 
The trial court ruled that, because Westgate filed its motion to vacate within 90 
days of the issuance of the award (the prescribed deadline for such a motion), Westgate's 
filing was timely. (Exh. 1, p. 8.) But that was not CPG's argument. CPG agreed that 
Westgate's motion to vacate was filed within 90 days of the award. CPG argued, 
however, that Westgate had waived the grounds upon which vacatur was sought, because 
it did not object to arbitrator Burbidge's participation or alleged non-disclosure within a 
reasonable time of when it knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have 
known, of the perceived grounds. (R. 5975.) 
If it was the trial court's intent to suggest that waiver cannot be argued under the 
Utah Arbitration Act, such interpretation would be inconsistent with a long line of case 
law to the contrary. See ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 65, ffl| 
26-36, 245 P.3d 184, and cases cited. The trial court flatly erred in failing to address 
CPG's argument, and to consider whether a waiver by conduct had occurred, particularly 
given the post-award timing of Westgate' s obj ection. 
9
 Temporal proximity has long been recognized as evidence of motive. See, e.g., Vikrton 
v. Labor Commission, 2001 UT App 394 fii 6 ("[njormally, a close temporal proximity 
between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action may justify an 
inference of retaliatory motive.") (internal citations omitted); State of Utah v. Germonto, 
868 P.2d 50, 59 (Utah 1993)(in a criminal context, information may be consolidated 
where the crimes were part of the same criminal episode, evidence of which may be the 
temporal proximity of the crimes.) 
i i 
Remand on this issue is not required, however, because CPG's argument was 
largely based upon undisputed facts. According to Westgate, all that was required to 
learn of the alleged nondisclosure was to notice that an attorney named Burbidge was 
listed on Christensen & Jensen's letterhead. (R. 6049.) This was, by definition, 
something that Westgate could have observed at any time over the prior six years. 
As one federal court judge has observed, when information about an arbitrator 
"could have been ascertained by more thorough inquiry or investigation, a post-award 
challenge suggests that nondisclosure is being raised merely as a tactical response to 
having lost the arbitration or an inappropriate attempt to seek a second bite at the apple 
because of dissatisfaction with the outcome." Hobet Mining, Inc. v. International Union, 
United Mine Workers of America, 877 F. Supp. 1011, 1019 (S.D.W.Va. 1994) (internal 
citations omitted). 
In a similar context, but involving the disqualification of a judge, this Court has 
stated: 
A party who has a reasonable basis for moving to disqualify a judge may 
not delay in the hope of first obtaining a favorable ruling and then 
complaint only if the result is unfavorable. Not only is such a tactic 
unfair, but it may evidence a belief that the judge is not in fact biased. 
Furthermore, delay imposes unnecessary disruption on both the judicial 
system and litigants. A disqualification proceeding is a collaterally attack 
on the substantive action, it disrupts orderly litigation, and it necessarily 
results in significant additional costs to the parties. Accordingly, a party 
must move with dispatch once a basis for disqualification is discovered. 
i~> 
Madsen v. Prudential Fed Sav. & Loan Ass % 161 P.2d 538, 544 (Utah 1988). 
George Burbidge's name has been on Christensen & Jensen's firm header 
throughout C & J's representation of CPG, which began in 2004. See R. 5933 (select 
copies of correspondence from C & J to Westgate's counsel, Richard Epstein.) Indeed, it 
is undisputed that the very letter in which CPG appointed Arbitrator Burbidge was on that 
same letterhead, that Burbidge's name was prominently at the top of the letterhead, and 
that the letter was directed to Westgate's lead counsel. See Exh 3 hereto. In the court 
below, Westgate offered no explanation for the timing of its letterhead review. 
CPG further argued that a previous last-minute "discovery" by Westgate should be 
considered. Almost four years into the District Court litigation - and shortly before trial 
- Westgate said it had suddenly noticed that the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act 
contains an arbitration provision. Westgate said that none of its attorneys had ever 
noticed the statutory provision before, even though it is contained in the UPUAA's key 
remedies section, and Westgate had cited other provisions of the UPUAA in the 
litigation. (R. 3062.) Westgate used this alleged last-minute discovery to file a motion to 
compel arbitration and seek a stay of the trial. (R. 4708.) 
Such eleventh-hour (or, in this case, thirteenth-hour) discoveries are antithetical to 
the state trial court's goal that the arbitration be "handled as expeditiously as reasonably 
10
 Although the threshold for seeking recusal of a judge does not apply in arbitration, 
analogy to U.R.Civ.P. 63 is informative. Under Rule 63, a party waives any right to seek 
recusal unless the motion is brought within 20 days of when "the moving party leams or 
with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which 
the motion is based." (Emphasis added.) 
3? 
possible." Arbitration Panel's Pre-Arbitration Order and Hearing Notice, p. 2. See also, 
DeVore v. IHC, 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994) ("the policy of our law favors 
arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating disputes.") 
By Westgate's own admission, the only information needed to discover the 
familial relationship was and had been available to Westgate from the beginning of the 
arbitration. Westgate's delay, along with the severe resulting prejudice, supports a 
finding of waiver as an alternative reason to reverse as, like the Second Circuit, this Court 
cannot "intend that unsuccessful parties to arbitration may have awards set aside by 
seeking out and finding tenuous relationships between [an] arbitrator and the successful 
party." More lite Construction Corp. v. NY City District Council Carpenters Benefit 
Fund, 748 F.2d 79, 85 (2nd Cir. 1984)(cited approvingly by this Court in DeVore,) 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND 
LITIGATION EXPENSES ON APPEAL 
As urged above, CPG is entitled to an order reversing the trial court's order of 
vacatur as manifest error. If CPG prevails in this appeal, it is entitled to "reasonable 
attorney fees and other reasonable expenses of litigation" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-11-126 (fees and expenses recoverable by prevailing party in contested judicial 
proceeding under Section 78B-11-123 (confirmation) or 78B-11-124 (vacatur).) 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's legal ruling 
that a first cousin relationship with an attorney not directly involved in the arbitration, 
14 
without more, triggered a duty to disclose on the part of the arbitrator and provided a 
basis for vacating the award. 
DATED this 18th day of May, 2011. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
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FILED 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER 
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Date: September 30,2010 
Case No.: 020404068 
Judge: Lynn W. Davis 
I. Procedural Posture 
This matter comes before the Court on two outstanding motions: Consumer Protection 
Group's Combined Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and for Attorney Fees and Expenses 
and For Rule 54(B) Certification of Judgment as Final, and Westgate Resorts' Opposition to 
Consumer Protection Group's Combined Motion and Westgate Resorts1 Motion to Vacate 
Arbitration Award. 
II. Arguments of the Parties 
a. Consumer Protection Group's Arguments in Support of Combined Motion 
Consumer Protection Group ("CPG") states that a highly qualified arbitration panel 
issued an award of $65,500 in favor of CPG and against Westgate Resorts ("Westgate"). The 
Utah Arbitration Act requires the district court to issue an order confirming the arbitration award 
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unless the award is modified or corrected pursuant to statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-
123. CPG argues that based on this, the arbitration award should be confirmed. 
Further, CPG argues entitlement to attorney fees and costs associated with the arbitration 
and Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act ("UPUAA") claims. CPG seeks attorney fees on two 
independent grounds. First, the UPUAA entitles a prevailing plaintiff to recover reasonable 
attorney fees and expenses. Id § 76-10-1605(2). Second, the Utah Arbitration Act provides that 
a "court may allow reasonable costs of the motion (to confirm] and subsequent judicial 
proceedings." Id. § 78B-1 M26(2); Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc., 925 P.2d 
941, 953 (Utah 1996). In the instant case, Westgate refused to voluntarily pay the arbitration 
award, forcing CPG to file this motion to confirm. 
Finally, CPG requests the arbitration judgment to be certified as a final order under Rule 
54(B), as there is no just reason for delay and there is no overlap in this judgment and any other 
remaining issues in the case. 
hi. Westgate's Arguments in Opposition to Combined Motion and in Support of Motion to 
Vacate Arbitration Award 
Westgate avers that the arbitrator chosen by CPG, Richard D. Burbidge, is a first cousin 
to CPG attorney George W. Burbidge II. Based on this fact alone, as supported by abundant law, 
this Court should deny CPG's Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and grant Westgate's 
Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award. 
Westgate argues that the statute which requires the Court to confirm an arbitration award 
has a key exception; the Court has a duty to confirm unless "the award is vacated pursuant to 
Section 78B-11-124." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-123. The exception statute states that the 
Court shall vacate an arbitration award if there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed 
as a neutral arbitrator, corruption or misconduct by an arbitrator. 
Required disclosures, found in Utah Code 78B-11-113, include an existing or past 
relationship between any arbitrator and any counsel or representatives of a party to the 
arbitration. The statute imposes a duty to disclose to all parties and to other arbitrators any facts 
"which a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator." Id. 
§ 78B-11-113(2). The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes requires 
arbitrators to disclose facts regarding any personal relationship which might affect impartiality or 
independence in the eyes of any of the parties. Further, any doubt should be resolved in favor of 
disclosure. 
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Westgate asserts that there was no such disclosure. In this case, the arbitrators had the 
power to award $1.2 million in attorney fees to CPG. George Burbidge's direct financial interest 
in the outcome of the case, left in the hands of the first cousin Richard Burbidge, is surely a 
reason to doubt the validity of any such award. Westgate should have been informed of this 
decision so Westgate could choose to demand disqualification from the Panel. Further, the lack 
of disclosure to the other arbitrators surely poisoned the well, calling into question any decision 
of the Panel. 
Westgate further argues that it does not matter that Arbitrator Burbidge was selected by 
CPG. There was still a duty to disclose, CPG cannot argue that Westgate knew that Arbitrator 
Burbidge was not neutral because the Panel prepared a fee agreement in which the arbitrators 
designated themselves as neutral arbitrators. The arbitrators were bound by the Code of Ethics, 
and thus bound by duty to disclose any potential conflicts or reasons for impartiality, such as a 
familial relationship with a party or its counsel. 
Under section 78B-11-113(4) an arbitrator's failure to disclose a fact such as an existing 
or past relationship with a party's counsel, is grounds for vacating under 78B-1 l-124(b). Failure 
to disclose constitutes "evident partiality." Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145,148 (1968), 
The Utah Ethics Advisory Committee has opined that the participation of a cousin may 
result injudicial disqualification. Further, if the judge's impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned, the judge should either recuse or disclose the relationship to the parties to allow them 
to decide whether recusal is warranted. 
& CPG's Arguments Against Westgate's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award 
CPG argues that Westgate has waived any rights to seek recusal. First, the timing of 
Westgate's Motion to Vacate, given its history in this litigation, is suspect Losing parties in an 
arbitration should not get a second bite at the apple when the facts show that the losing party 
should have discovered their basis for disqualification or recusal before the arbitration. 
CPG asks the Court to look at the timing of the motion to vacate, which is clear evidence 
of Westgate's motive. Further, Westgate has a history of making prior late discoveries, costing 
the parties great expense and time. 
Moreover, CPG argues that Arbitrator Burbidge was not technically neutral under the 
Utah Arbitration Act. However, the arbitrators did consider themselves neutral after their 
appointment and conducted themselves accordingly. 
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Party-selected arbitrators are clearly not the same as arbitrator-appointed arbitrators. 
Courts have recognized the differences between them. For example, it is reasonable that party-
selected arbitrators might have some subjectiveness and they are not expected to adhere to the 
same standard of neutrality as a judge. In fact, even if a party-selected arbitrator had a substantial 
relationship with a party or attorney, the law states that the arbitrator "may not serve as an 
arbitrator required by an agreement to be neutral." Id § 78B-11-112(2) (emphasis added). 
CPG points out that there was no such neutrality agreement; it was added by the arbitrators 
themselves after they commenced the arbitration. 
Even if all the arbitrators had been neutral, CPG argues that Westgate did not even come 
close to making a prima facie case for disqualification. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that to 
vacate an arbitration award, "the evidence of partiality must be certain and direct, not remote, 
uncertain, or speculative." DeVore v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 1246,1256 (Utah 1994). 
CPG argues that Westgate's motion is full of speculation. The only feet alleged is that the 
Burbidges are first cousin. Every other "fact" drawn from that is mere hypothesis and conjecture. 
Further, CPG contends that Westgate misquoted a Utah Ethics Advisory Committee 
opinion regarding whether a judge who is a cousin to one of the parties should recuse. The &U 
quote shows that the cousin relationship is relevant only "if a close personal relationship exists." 
Utah Ethics Advisory Committee, Informal Opinion 89-5. 
George Burbidge II and Richard Burbidge do not have a close personal relationship. 
Richard is one of 22 first cousins of George. They are nearly 20 years apart in age. They do not 
speak regularly, have no active social relationship, no business or personal connection, and in 
fact have not spoken in many months. Indeed, the Burbidges have been adverse to each other in 
litigation before. A mere genetic relationship does not constitute a substantial relationship 
requiring disclosure or recusal. 
CPG argues that Westgate has provided no evidence supporting claims of corruption, 
fraud, undue means, or evident partiality. Arbitrator Burbidge has no interest in the outcome of 
the arbitration, and no existing substantial relationship with any party. Because no evidence to 
support any of the statutory or judicially created grounds exists, a motion to vacate an award 
must be denied. Buzas Baseball Inc. v Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d at 951. 
Moreover, federal decisions do not support Westgate* s argument. CPG cites several 
federal cases to show that the standard to vacate an arbitration award is a heavy, onerous burden, 
and that the mere existence of a genetic relationship or the mere fact of a prior relationship is not 
sufficient to cast doubt on the arbitrator's impartiality. If a reasonable person objectively 
viewing all the facts would fairly entertain doubts about impartiality, then the arbitrator would be 
subject to disqualification. CPG alleges that once all the facts are known about the relationship 
between the two Burbidges, no reasonable person could have doubts about Arbitrator Burbidge's 
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impartiality. Also, general guidelines from the American Arbitration Association and found in 
the Uniform Arbitration Act do not support vacating this award under these circumstances. 
Finally, CPG asserts that Westgate's motion is brought in bad faith. Westgate did not file 
a certificate that the motion was filed in good faith, which would have been required in a motion 
to disqualify a judge under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63. Westgate's long history of 
attacking CPG and delaying the judicial process continues with the motion to vacate. Without 
supporting evidence, Westgate accuses Arbitrator Burbidge and CPG of impropriety and bias. 
These accusations should not be tolerated. 
Based on the foregoing, CPG seeks confirmation of the arbitration award and denial of 
Westgate's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award. 
d- Westgate's Reply Arguments to CPG's Opposition to Westgate's Motion to Vacate 
In reply, Westgate argues that it never waived the right to move to vacate based on 
Arbitrator Burbidge's failure to make a statutorily required disclosure. The burden was not on 
Westgate to discover an improper link between arbitrator and attorney; the burden was on the 
parties so linked to disclose. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113. 
Further, the concealment of the relationship calls into question the impartiality of the 
arbitrator. Thus, both the relationship and the concealment of the relationship create doubts as to 
the validity of the outcome of the arbitration. Also, CPG's citation of Rule 63 and its 20-day 
deadline is not applicable in this case as the rule applies only to judges. 
The emails show that Westgate brought this issue to the attention of the parties as soon as 
it noticed the similarity in names. After confirmation that the Burbidges were first cousins, 
Westgate immediately sent a letter to the Panel raising the issue. There was no bad-faith delay by 
Westgate. The bad faith is by CPG, who failed to make required disclosures, and Arbitrator 
Burbidge, who is statutorily required by Subsection 78B-11-113(1) to disclose before accepting 
appointment. 
Moreover, Westgate argues that CPG's contention that Burbidge was not neutral simply 
confirms the doubts as to his impartiality. It also goes against the Arbitration Fee Agreement, 
which stated that "(t]he panel members each consider themselves as neutral arbitrators." Also, 
because Burbidge told the parties he was neutral, then any argument that there was no duty to 
disclose the relationship is wrong. Westgate had every reason and right to believe that the Panel 
was composed of neutral arbitrators, based on the parties' agreement, on statutory law, and on the 
representation of the Panel. 
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Westgate reiterates that according to Utah statute, an arbitrator who does not disclose a 
relationship with counsel "is presumed to act with evident partiality." Id § 78B-11-113(5). 
Thus, Westgate did not have to produce evidence of partiality because the failure to disclose 
gives rise to a presumption of partiality. The Panel itself expressly adopted the AAA Code of 
Ethics, which requires all arbitrators, whether neutral or not, to disclose any facts which might 
affect their neutrality, independence and partiality. A familial relationship is obviously one 
which falls within the type of information that might reasonably affect impartiality and should be 
disclosed. See Burlington Northern Railroad Corp v. TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629,637 (Tex. 
1997). Westgate also argues that CPG's cited cases do not support its contention. 
Finally, Westgate contends that CPG has engaged in distortion, deceit, and 
misrepresentation. 
Based on the foregoing, Westgate requests this Court to vacate the arbitration award. 
HI. Ruling 
The Court reluctantly grants Westgate's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award and denies 
CPG's Combined Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and for Attorney Fees and Expenses and 
For Rule 54(B) Certification of Judgment as Final. The Utah Uniform Arbitration Act provides: 
(1) Before accepting appointment, an individual who is requested 
to serve as an arbitrator, after making a reasonable inquiry, shall 
disclose to all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration 
proceeding and to any other arbitrators any known facts that a 
reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality 
of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, including: 
(b) an existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the 
agreement to arbitrate or the arbitration proceeding, their counsel 
or representatives, a witness, or another arbitrator. 
(4) If the arbitrator did not disclose a fact as required by Subsection 
(1) or (2), upon timely objection by a party, the court under 
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Subsection 78B-1 l-124(l)(b) may vacate an award. 
(5) An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator who does not 
disclose a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of 
the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial 
relationship with a party is presumed to act with evident partiality 
under Subsection 78B-1 l-124(i)(b). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113. Additionally, "[a]n individual who has . . , a known, existing, 
and substantial relationship with a party may not serve as an arbitrator required by an agreement 
to be neutral," under § 78B-11-112(2). 
When an arbitrator fails to disclose or otherwise violates the rights of a party to the 
proceeding, § 78B-11-124 provides: 
(1) Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration 
proceeding, the court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration 
proceeding if: 
(b) there was: 
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral 
arbitrator; [or] 
(iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to 
the arbitration proceeding. 
Such motion must be filed within 90 days. See Id, If the Court grants that motion, then the Court 
is not required to issue an order confirming the award. See Id. § 78B-11-123, 
The question at issue is whether Richard D. Burbidge should have disclosed his 
relationship to counsel. A first cousin relationship is a fact that an arbitrator would be required to 
disclose because a reasonable person would consider this fact likely to affect the impartiality of 
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the arbitrator. In the present case, the arbitrator Richard D. Burbidge did not disclose his 
relationship to counsel as he was required to do by statute. 
CPG asserts the relationship is not particularly close and that this omission does not meet 
the standard to vacate the award because "the evidence of partiality must be certain and direct, 
not remote, uncertain, or speculative.'1 DeVore v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 1246,1256. But 
the standard is not proof-of-actual-bias; this standard would be neigh impossible to meet Id. The 
"certain and direct, not remote, uncertain, or speculative" evidence must be evidence of facts that 
"a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator." Utah Code 
Ann. §78B-11-113. The first cousin relationship is an uncontroverted fact. 
The quality of the Burbidges' relationship does not change Arbitrator Burbidge's duty to 
disclose. Though CPG argues a judge in a similar situation need not recuse, the Supreme Court 
of the United States has ruled, "[W]e should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to safeguard 
the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the former have completely free rein to decide 
the law as well as the facts and are not subject to appellate review. We can perceive no way in 
which the effectiveness of the arbitration process will be hampered by the simple requirement 
that the arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible 
bias." Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145,148 (1968). 
Additionally, the arbitrators were all designated as neutral in the fee agreement Even if 
this was done sua sponte7 the designation that they were neutral is in a fonnal agreement with the 
parties. Under Utah Code § 78B-11-112(2), Arbitrator Burbidge, in the absence of disclosure, 
should not have served at all, and under § 78B-11-113(5) his service creates a presumption of 
partiality. 
His failure to disclose the relationship as required by § 78B-11-113(l)(b) violated the 
rights of Westgate to know the facts Arbitrator Burbidge was required to reveal, and he is 
presumed partial under § 78B-11-113(5). CPG's argument that Westgate's motion should be 
denied for timeliness fails. The statue sets the time limit at 90 days. The award was entered 
February 2,2010. Westgate filed its motion April 8,2010. Westgate*s motion was timely. 
Therefore, this Court vacates the arbitration award according to §§ 78B-1 l-124(l)(b)(i) and (iii). 
Wcstgate's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award is granted. 
CPG's Combined Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and for Attorney Fees and 
Expenses and For Rule 54(b) Certification of Judgement as Final is denied. 
The Court instructs counsel for Westgate to prepare an order consistent with this opinion. 
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Richard W. Epstein, Esq. (admitted/>ro hac vice) 
Rebecca R Bratter, Esq. (admitted/;n* hac vice) 
GREENSPOON MARDER, P. A. 
Trade Centre South, Ste. 700 
100 West Cyprus Creek Road 
Fort Lauderdale, EL 33309 
Telephone: (954) 4914120 
Facsimile: (954) 343-6958 
Attorneys for Westgate Resorts, IAL 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTGATB RESORTS, LTD.. 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SHAUNS.ADBL and CONSUMER 
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON CONSUMER PROTECTION 
GROUP, IXC'S COMBINED MOTION 
TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD 
AND FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND 
EXPENSES AND FOR RULE 54(B) 
I CERTIFICATION OP JUDGMENT AS 
1 PINAL, AND WESTGATE RESORTS 
LIU 'S MOTION TO VACATE 
ARBITRATION AWARD 
Case No.: 020404068 
Division No. 8 
Judge: Lynn W.Davis 
Pursuant to this Court's Ruling dated September 30,2010, attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
and incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that: 
1. Westgate Resorts, Ltd/s Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award is GRANTED; 
FILED 
DEC 1 3 20!(T 
4TH DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
2. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Arbitration Award dated February 
2, 2010 issued in the aibitration proceedings styled: Consumer Protection Group, LLC v. 
Westgate Resorts, Ltd., is VACATED, RENDfiRBD NULL AND VOID and OF NO FORCE 
AND EFFECT; and 
3. Consumer Protection Group, LLC's Combined Motion to Confirm Arbitration 
Award and for Attorney Fees and Expenses and For Rule 54(b) Certification of Judgment as 
Final is DENIED. 
DATED this W day ofO*****, 2010. 
Approved As To Fonn: 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHAUL S. ADEL and CPG, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 020404068 
Oral Argument Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
August 4, 2010 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS 
Fourth District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Richard W. Epstein 
GREENSPOON, MARDER 
100 West Cypress Creek Road 
Suite 700 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 
Telephone: (954)491-1120 
L. Rick Humphreys 
Karra J. Porter 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
15 West South Temple 
Beneficial Tower, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)323-5000 
Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT 
1771 South California Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-2927 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 J (Electronically recorded on August 4, 2010) 
3 I THE COURT: You may be seated. Let's go on the record 
4 I in the case of Westgate Resorts vs. Shaun Adel and CPG. This 
5 J is 020404068. Record will reflect that Richard Epstein is 
6 there, as it relates to Westgate Resorts. Rich Humphreys, Karra 
7 I Porter here representing the defendants. 
8 I Counsel, let's see, I only brought one file before 
9 I me. It's file 19 in this case. So it's — there's a bit of 
10 J history, as we all are aware, in this case. We've had — today 
11 I we've had somewhere between 80 and 85 felony cases, some civil 
12 I cases. The criminal cases range everything from a first-degree 
13 I murder case to a variety of other — other matters. If I don't 
14 I seem real sharp in responding to your questions, there is a 
15 I reason for that. 
16 I Let me -- let me state on the record what I believe is 
17 I the procedural posture as it relates to the matters before the 
18 I Court, and then a briefing as it relates to the substantive 
19 I arguments on both sides. Then I have a couple of questions 
20 I that will give you some guidance, and then we can proceed. 
21 I The matter comes before the Court on two outstanding 
22 J motions; CPG's combined motion to confirm arbitration award 
23 I and for attorney's fees and expenses, and for a Rule 54(b) 
24 J certification of judgment is final, as Westgate's opposition 
25 I to CPG's combined motion, and Westgate's motion to vacate the 
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arbitration award. 
The arguments of the parties — the briefing is very 
extensive, and I think fairly thorough; but to consolidate the 
arguments, 1 think they can be presented as follows. CPG's 
arguments in support of the combined motion are as follows. 
We have CPG states that a highly qualified arbitration panel 
issued an award of 60,000 — $65,500 in favor of CPG and 
against Westgate. 
The Otah Arbitration Act requires a District Court to 
issue an order confirming arbitration award, unless the award 
is modified or corrected pursuant to statute. They rely upon 
Utah Code Annotated 78 (b)-11-123. 
CPG argues that based on this, the arbitration award 
should be confirmed. Further, CPG argues entitlement to 
attorney's fees and costs associated with the arbitration and 
Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, the UPUAA claims. 
CPG seeks attorney's fees on two independent grounds. 
First, the UPUAA entitles a prevailing plaintiff to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees and expenses. That's under 76-10-
1605(2). Second, the Utah Arbitration Act provides that a, 
quote, MA Court may allow reasonable costs of the motion to 
confirm in subsequent judicial proceedings, based upon Buzz's 
Baseball, Inc. vs. Salt Lake Trappers." 
In the instant case, Westgate refused to voluntarily 
pay the arbitration award, forcing CPG to file this motion for 
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confirmation. Finally, CPG requests the arbitration judgment 
be certified as a final order under Rule 54 (b) . There is no 
just reason for delay, and there's no overlap in this judgment, 
in any other remaining issues in the case. 
Westgate's argument in opposition to the combined 
motion and in support of its motion to vacate the arbitration 
award are as follows. Westgate avers that the arbitrator 
chosen by CPG, that Richard D. Burbidge, is a first cousin to 
CPG attorney, George W. Burbidge, II. Based upon this fact 
alone, it's supported by abundant law this Court should deny 
CPG's motion to confirm arbitration award, and grant Westgate's 
motion to vacate the arbitration award. 
Westgate argues that the statute which requires the 
Court to confirm an arbitration award has a key exception, if, 
quote, the award is vacated pursuant to section 78(b)-11-124. 
The exception statute states that the Court shall vacate an 
arbitration award if there was evident partiality by an 
arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator, or corruption, 
or misconduct by an arbitrator. 
Required disclosures found in Utah Code 78(b)-11-113 
include an existing or past relationship between any arbitrator 
and any Counsel or representative of party to the arbitration. 
The statute imposes a duty to disclose to all parties, and 
to other arbitrators any facts, quote, "which a reasonable 
person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the 
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arbitrator." 
The code of ethics for the arbitrators — or for 
arbitrators in commercial disputes requires arbitrators to 
disclose facts regarding any personal relationship which might 
affect impartiality or independence in the eyes of any parties. 
Further, any doubt should be resolved in favor of disclosure. 
Westgate asserts that there was no such disclosure. 
In this case the arbitrators have the power to award 1.2 
million in attorney's fees to CPG. George Burbidge's direct 
financial interest in the outcome of the case left in the hands 
of his first cousin, Richard Burbidge, surely a reason to doubt 
the validity of any such award. 
Westgate should have been informed of this decision 
so Westgate could choose to demand disqualification from the 
panel. Further, the lack of disclosure to the other arbitrators 
surely poisoned the well, calling into question any decision 
with the panel. 
Westgate further argues that it does not matter that 
arbitrator Burbidge was selected by CPG, there was still a 
duty to disclose. CPG cannot argue that Westgate knew that 
arbitrator Burgess — Burbidge was not neutral, because the 
panel prepared a fee agreement in which the arbitrators 
designated themselves as neutral arbitrators. 
The arbitrators were bound by the code of ethics, 
and thus bound by duty to disclose any potential conflicts or 
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reasons for impartiality, such as a familial relationship with 
a party or its Counsel. 
Under Section 78 (b)-11-113(4), an arbitrator's failure 
to disclose a fact such as an existing or past relationship 
with the party's Counsel is grounds for vacating under 
78(b)-11-124(b). Failure to disclose constitutes evident 
partiality. That's relied upon the holding in Commonwealth 
Codings Corporation vs. Continental Casualty. 
The Utah Ethics Advisory Committee has opined 
that the participation of a cousin may result in judicial 
disqualification. Further, if a Judge's impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned, the Judge should either recuse or 
disclose the relationship to the parties, to allow them to 
decide whether recusal is warranted. 
Now, CPG's arguments against Westgate's motion to 
vacate the arbitration award are confined as follows: CPG 
argues that Westgate has waived any rights to seek recusal. 
First, the timing of Westgate's motion to vacate, given its 
history in this litigation, is suspect. 
Losing parties in an arbitration — a losing party in 
an arbitration should not get a second bite at the apple, and 
the facts show that the losing party should have discovered the 
basis for disqualification and recusal before the arbitration. 
CPG asked the Court to look at the timing of the 
motion to vacate, which is clear evidence of Westgate's motive. 
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He3tgate has a history of making prior relayed discoveries, 
costing the parties great expense and time. Moreover, CPG 
argues that arbitrator Burbidge was not technically neutral 
under the Utah Arbitration Act. However, the arbitrators 
did consider themselves neutral after their appointment, and 
conducted themselves accordingly. 
Party selected arbitrators are clearly not the same as 
arbitrator appointed arbitrators, or Court appointed. Courts 
have recognized the differences between them. For example, it 
is reasonable that party selected arbitrators might have some 
subjectiveness. They're not expected to adhere to the same 
standard of neutrality as a Judge. 
In fact, even if a party selected arbitrator has 
a substantial relationship with a party or attorney, the 
law states that the arbitrator, quote, "may not serve as an 
arbitrator required by an agreement of neutrality," or to be 
neutral. 
Now, CPG points out that there was no such neutrality 
agreement. It was added by the arbitrators, themselves, after 
they commenced the arbitration. Even if the arbitrators had 
been neutral, CPG argues that Westgate did not even come close 
to making a prima facie case for disqualification. 
Utah Supreme Court ruled to vacate an arbitration 
award, the evidence of partiality must be certain, direct, not 
remote, uncertain or speculative. CPG argues that Westgate's 
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motion is full of speculation. The only fact alleged is that 
Burbidges are first cousins. Every other fact drawn from that 
is mere hypothesis and conjecture. 
Further, CPG contends that Westgate misquoted a Utah 
Ethics Advisory Committee opinion regarding whether a Judge 
who is a cousin to one of the parties should recuse. The full 
quote shows that the cousin relationship is relevant only, 
quote, *if a close personal relationship exists." (Jtah Ethics 
Advisory Committee and formal opinion 89-5. 
George Burbidge, II and Richard Burbidge do not have a 
close personal relationship. Richard is one of 22 first cousins 
of George. They are nearly 20 years in age apart. They do 
not speak regularly, have no active social relationship, no 
business or personal connection, and in fact have not spoken 
in many months. Indeed, the Burbidges have been adverse to 
each other in litigation before. A mere genetic relationship 
does not constitute a substantial relationship requiring 
disclosure or recusal. 
CPG argues that Westgate has provided no evidence 
supporting the claims of corruption, fraud, undue means, or 
evident partiality. Arbitrator Burbidge has no interest 
in the outcome of the arbitration, no existing substantial 
relationship with any party. Because no evidence to support 
any of the statutory or judicially created grounds exist, a 
motion to vacate an award must be denied. 
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Moreover, Federal decisions to support Westgate's 
argument do not in fact support Westgate's argument. CPG 
cites several Federal cases to show that the standard to vacate 
an arbitration award is a heavy, onerous burden; and that the 
mere existence of a genetic relationship or the mare fact of 
prior relationship is not sufficient to cast doubt on the 
arbitrator's impartiality. 
A reasonable person objectively viewing all the facts 
would fairly entertain doubts about impartiality. Then the 
arbitrator would be subject to disqualification. 
CPG alleges that once all the facts are known about the 
relationship between the two Burbidges, no reasonable person 
could have doubts about arbitrator Burbidge's impartiality. 
Also, general guidelines from American Arbitration Association 
found in the Uniform Arbitration Act do not support vacating 
this award under these circumstances. 
Finally, CPG asserts that Westgate's motion is brought 
in bad faith. Westgate did not file a certificate that the 
motion was filed in good faith, which would have been required 
in a motion to disqualify a Judge under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 63. 
Westgate's long history of attacking and delaying the 
judicial process continues with a motion to vacate. Without 
supporting evidence, Westgate accuses arbitrator Burbidge and 
CPG of an impropriety and bias. These accusations should not 
-10-
1 I be tolerated Based on the foregoing, CPG seeks confirmation 
2 J of the award and denial of Westgate's motion to vacate the 
3 I arbitration award. 
4 I Lastly, m reply, Westgate argues that it never waived 
5 I the right to move to vacate based upon arbitrator Burbidge's 
6 I failure to make a statutory required disclosure. The burden 
7 I was not on Westgate to discover an improper link between an 
8 I arbitrator and an attorney. The burden was on the parties so 
9 I linked to disclose. 
10 Further, the concealment of the relationship calls 
11 I into question the impartiality of the arbitrator Thus, both 
12 I the relationship and the concealment of the relationship create 
13 J doubts as to the validity of the outcome of the arbitration. 
14 J Also, CPG's citation of Rule 63 and its 20-day deadline is not 
15 I applicable in this case, as the rule applies only to Judges. 
16 I The emails attached as exhibits show that Westgate 
17 I brought this issue to the attention of the parties as soon as 
18 I it noticed the similarity in names. After confirmation that 
19 I the Burbidges were first cousins, Westgate immediately sent a 
20 I letter to the panel raising the issue. 
21 I There's no bad faith delay by Westgate. The bad 
22 I faith is by CPG, who failed to make required disclosures, and 
23 I arbitrator Burbidge, who was statutorily required by subsection 
24 I 78(b)-11-113 to disclose before accepting appointment. 
25 I Moreover, Westgate argues that CPG's contention that 
- 1 1 -
1 I Burbidge was not neutral simply confirms the doubt — doubts 
2 I as to his impartiality. Also goes against the arbitration fee 
3 I agreement, which states, quote, that the panel members each 
4 I consider themselves as ^neutral arbitrators," 
5 I Also, because Burbidge told the parties he was 
6 I neutral, and any argument that there was no duty to disclose 
7 I the relationship is just absolutely wrong. Westgate had every 
8 J reason and right to believe that the panel was composed of 
9 I neutral arbitrators, based on the parties' agreement, on 
10 I statutory law, and the repres -- actual representations of 
11 I the panel. 
12 I Westgate reiterates that according to Utah statute, an 
13 I arbitrator who does not disclose a relationship with Counsel is 
14 I presumed to act with evide'nt partiality. Thus, Westgate did 
15 I not have to produce evidence of partiality because of the 
16 I failure to disclose. The very act, or the very failure to 
17 I disclose gives rise to a presumption of partiality. 
18 I The panel, itself, expressly adopted the triple A code 
19 I of ethics, which requires all arbitrators, whether neutral or 
20 J not, to disclose any facts which might affect their neutrality, 
21 J independence and partiality. A familial relationship is 
22 I obviously one of those which follows within the type of 
23 I information that might reasonably affect impartiality, and 
24 I should be disclosed, based upon the Burlington Northern 
25 I Railroad Corporation vs. Tucco, Inc. 
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Fmally, Westgate contends that CPG has engaged m 
distortion, deceit, and misrepresentation. Based upon the 
foregoing, Westgate requests this Court to vacate the 
arbitration award. 
Now, here are my questions for you. I don't know 
whether the award of $65,000 frankly is an award that favors 
Westgate or favors CPG. I have no idea. If CPG was asking 
for millions of dollars, and there was an award of $65,000, it 
would appear to the Court, then, that Westgate is in fact — 
has prevailed at the arbitration hearing. 
Next, the United States Supreme Court stated, "We 
should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to safeguard the 
impartiality of arbitrators than Judges." More so as it 
relates to arbitrators than Judges. "Since the former have 
completely free reign to decide the law, as well as the facts, 
and are subject to appellate review, we can perceive no way 
in which the effectiveness of the arbitration process will 
be hampered by the simply requirement that the arbitrators 
disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an 
impression of possible bias." 
Well, the issue is dealings, at least under that case 
law. Not familial relationship, but dealings. Now, on the 
one hand you have the CPG attorneys and relationship as it 
relates to the arbitrator, though it's a very distant cousin 
relationship. As pointed out, 1 think there is a disparity of 
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approximately 20 years. They are not close, and they have 
actually been advocates on opposite sides in litigation. 
Then next question I have is Burbidge is not a very 
common name. Why didn't Westgate at least ask CPG about this 
coincidence? One could argue that any reasonable opponent in 
the litigation or arbitration would have wondered what the 
relationship was, if any, between the Burbidges. It's not a 
common name. 
If — you know, is there any affirmative duty as 
it relates to Westgate? Does it constitute a — is it a 
significant enough uncommon name so that it may constitute 
a waiver? Those are some of the concerns as it relate --
from the Court. May give some direction as it relates to 
your arguments. 
Then initially state on the record whether or not 
the briefing is very extensive, whether or not this short 
statement on the record appears to be accurate, or whether 
I've overlooked case law, or overlooked statutory provisions, 
or missed some of your claims. Let's proceed. 
MR. EPSTEIN: Your Honor, I suspect I should probably 
start, since the motion to confirm is really not in serious, 
you know, question here. It really kind of hinges on the 
motion to vacate. 
THE COURT: Vacate. 
MR. EPSTEIN: I think we've all conceded or recognize 
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that. 
THE COURT! Sure. 
MR. EPSTEIN: One small correction. In your recitation, 
which, as usual, I think that the parties would both agree was 
extremely thorough and precisely to the point, in the mot — 
the confirmation of award is governed by 78 (b)-11-123. 
When the Court recited what the exceptions, if you 
will, to the confirmation would be, it cited to a motion to 
modify or a motion to correct. It just basically overlooked 
that in the statute. The other exception is when the award was 
vacated, pursuant to Section — 
THE COURT: Sure, yeah. 
MR. EPSTEIN: — 78(b)-1-124. 
THE COURT: Recognize — 
MR. EPSTEIN: I think it was just a misstatement — 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. EPSTEIN: -- on the Court's part, but the record — 
I'd just like that to be clear for the record. 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. The vacation portion of that, or 
additional supplementation in connection with the exception, 
yes, sir. 
MR. EPSTEIN: Let me start with an observation first; 
and I think all of us on this side of the bench are certainly 
guilty of this, and probably guilty of it in our everyday 
conduct of our practice. That is that we too often think 
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lxke lawyers, as opposed to thinking like the parties to these 
proceedings, whom we represent. 
The issue here is not really what Westgate's lawyers 
did or didn't do, or should or shouldn't have done. Just like 
in reality as to some of the legal things, it's not what CPG's 
lawyers did or did not do; except in this case it is a bit 
different, because CPG's lawyers had personal knowledge of 
the issue that came to the forefront at the very end of the 
arbitration proceedings, and you know, we do fault them for 
not disclosing that, but we think through the lens of a lawyer. 
What prompted this issue is really what Westgate 
thought or thinks or has a right to think, when it now all 
of a sudden realizes, after having committed its time and 
its efforts and its resources, albeit through its lawyers, 
you know, to these three individuals, believing them to be 
completely unconnected and disinterested in the outcome of the 
case, and finds out that one of the arbitrators, unbeknownst to 
Westgate, unbeknownst to the party in the case, was related by 
a very close degree of {inaudible), first cousins, to a lawyer 
within CPG's law firm. 
That's the lens I think we all must look at this 
What is the party to believe-5 What is -- that, I think, also 
maybe — I won't say recasts, but certainly refines what the 
purpose of the disclosures are in the Utah Arbitration Code. 
It's not to inform the lawyers about this or that. It's to 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
-16-
make sure the parties have the sense and the realization that 
the process and the proceedings in which they are about to 
embark are not going to be infected. 
THE COURT: I agree with that, even in issues as it 
relates to recusals, and when attorneys appear before me, and 
I need to indicate as it relates to a relationship or whatever 
it may be, or a past partnership 20 or 30 years ago. 
It's not the attorneys that are the critical ones 
that stand before rae in connection with that ultimate judgment. 
I allow Counsel then to visit with their parties, with their 
clients, to ultimately make that determination relative to the 
issue of recusal. So your point's well taken. 
MR. EPSTEIN; Thank you, and just to conclude it, 
Westgate, in its view, had the right to know this before it 
engaged, you know, in these proceedings. If it, in fact --
you know, kind of leaped all the way to the end -- if, in fact, 
it is demonstrative true that there is no relationship that one 
would be concerned about between these two gentlemen, that's 
something that should be sorted out beforehand, not after the 
fact. 
I mean, it kind of turns on its head the whole notion 
of disclosure when you say, "But it wouldn't have mattered 
anyway." I mean, that's not the point. The point is that the 
disclosure gives the parties the opportunity to evaluate those 
matters before they engage in the process, and so as to give 
-17-
1 I them the best opportunity possible to insure that the process 
2 I itself is not flawed. That's what we feel unfortunately 
3 I occurred here. 
4 I So let's kind of start very — at the very fundamental 
5 I level here. As the Court is very aware, this arbitration is — 
6 I had somewhat unusual underpinnings. It is rare, you know, that 
7 I an arbitration proceeding is mandated or directed by statute. 
8 I It is much more commonplace that there be an agreement to 
9 I arbitrate. That is, in fact, the standard process. 
10 We do not have that here. We demonstratively do 
11 I not have a pre-litigation agreement between the parties to 
12 I arbitrate their disputes. It doesn't exist; we all acknowledge 
13 that. In fact, there are very few facts of that type with 
14 I which the parties disagree or dispute. 
15 So what we're dealing with here is an unusual case; 
16 one where sort of standard concepts and practices may not 
17 I operate in the traditional way that those of us, I'm sure 
18 I Richard and Karra, just like I am, we're very familiar with 
19 J the arbitration process. We deal with it quite a bit in our 
20 I normal day-to-day practice, and one that is predicated upon 
21 I a pre-litigation ar — agreement to arbitrate is much more 
22 I simpler — much more simple to implement. Typically it will 
23 I invoke a particular organization and its rules and procedures. 
24 I Here we did not have that. So basically the Court — 
25 1 you, your Honor — directed a procedure. So what we essentially 
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have here is an arbitration decreed, if you will, by law, 
where the parties were to arbitrate, and you directed how the 
arbitrators were to be selected, in a way that is, candidly, 
pretty commonplace. That would be the traditional — I won't 
say traditional — commonplace way for a three-member panel, 
which would be typical in a complex case, to be constituted; 
because otherwise, it's all going to end up back in your hands, 
which is something, obviously, that the Court would like to 
leave as much as possible to the parties. 
Let the parties have, you know, the involvement and 
control over the procedures. So again, nobody is criticizing 
in any fashion that process. It was a particular -- it was a 
particularly appropriate one under these circumstances. 
Where it left wanting, if you will, that might have 
been addressed if we had a pre-litigation agreement is some of 
the other criteria that would be applicable to the selection 
process. 
For instance, although it's not really in the record, 
but I think the Court can take judicial notice, the way the 
triple A works is that they send you a roster, and you get 
people that are supposedly qualified, and then you get to go 
through a selection process much like selecting a jury. You 
get to exercise peremptory challenges, and then you kind or 
rank the rest of them the way you want. FINRA, the security 
self-regulatory organization, uses a similar procedure. 
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parties had the right to actually determine what they wanted to 
know from each of the arbitrator candidates before making a 
selection. 
That is a huge distinguishing factor here. It's one 
thing to say in Hobart that, you know, the late challenge to 
the arbitrator, you know, is not, you know, legitimate and 
shouldn't be honored, when there was already an opportunity 
to fully investigate each of those arbitrator candidates before 
the selection process actually occurred. 
No such process existed here. What did exist here 
is the Utah Arbitration Code, which has not investigative 
procedures, but disclosure procedures. It puts the onus on 
the arbitrator and anyone who might have knowledge about the 
arbitrator, to make disclosures. 
I think that's where part of CPG's argument is so 
wrong, in answering your question, your Honor, and where --
the notion that Westgate had an obligation to inquire or 
investigate is also so wrong. That simply has never been the 
law under any of the cases that have been cited; and of course 
the case law, as the Court has already noted, is extensive. 
In the Commonwealth Codings case, which is the U.S. 
Supreme Court case, there's no notion, either in Justice 
Black's majority opinion or Justice White's concurring opinion, 
that there's some duty on the part of a party to investigate. 
None. Never considered. Never mentioned. Not even on the 
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the right question. 
That happens in life all the time; but it is the only 
time in any of the jurisprudence we've looked at in briefing 
this case, where there was any investigative responsibility on 
the part of the party, as opposed to disclosure responsibility; 
and it is so materially different that it is not the guidance 
the Court should have here, other than to show the stark 
contrast between what is every other case, and what is Hobart. 
Hobart is totally distinguishable on that basis, you 
know, and it has no bearing on the obligation on the part of 
the arbitrator to disclose. In that instance the duty on the 
— any obligation, if you will, that they wanted to imply on 
the arbitrator to disclose was extinguished because of the 
inquiry that occurred prior to appointment. 
Now, so I understand -- clearly we understand, you 
know, the Court's thoughts, you know, on this -- on this whole 
issue of whether there-was some duty to inquire under these or 
under any other circumstances. I mean, obviously you know what 
our answer is. Our answer --
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. EPSTEIN: — must be, "No;" but from a couple of 
different standpoints. First of all, everyone except Karra's 
wearing glasses here; and I will tell you, as I was reading 
over last night and this morning, was reading over the filings 
that CPG made in this, with the copies of some of samples of 
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So even arguing that this might be one of those 
situations where inquiry notice is appropriate, the law says 
otherwise. As a practical matter, why would one look if one 
has an expectation of disclosure? 
Where the law has developed, where disclosure's only 
one part of the overall picture, such as, for instance, in 
securities laws, where there is side-by-side with the duty on 
the one parts, and the issue or to make disclosures, there's 
also some duty on the part of the purchaser of a security to 
ask questions if facts are present that would give rise under 
the law to a duty to make reasonable inquiry. What they call 
— I just drew a blank what it's called — I mean, an inquiry 
notice. It's called "inquiry notice." 
Again, we don't have that here. Utah Courts have 
never spoken in terms of inquiry notice in an arbitration 
process where there's an affirmative duty of disclosure. No 
Court has ever imposed such a requirement, absent, of course, 
Hobart, which we've already talked about. 
So, again, the question is certainly a legitimate 
one, and I think an appropriate one from the standpoint of 
evaluating whether the parties may be engaged in intentional 
action; but none of it -- or malicious action; but none of 
it dispels the real issue here. That is, that the duty to 
provide affirmative disclosure is the only one that the law 
here recognizes. 
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it was favorable to CPG in that they won, for sure. To the 
extent that, you know, Westgate lostr it could have been a 
little worse, but again, that would have — it's really not a 
consequential number. 
It was liability that was hard fought here, not so 
much the damages, as was sort of down here. CPG just limited 
its damages to about 500 on a (inaudible) basis, to the $500 
fair value of the — the travel certificate. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. EPSTEIN: What the trip would have been worth, the 
two round-trip air fares and a couple of nights at a hotel. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EPSTEIN: Okay, I would like to just add one thing, 
I think, to the — to the issue of evaluating the reality of 
the relationship between Misters Burbidge. 
THE COURT: Yeah, but I think you've already covered 
that satisfactorily; that after the fact — 
MR. EPSTEIN: Yeah, but that's really — 
THE COURT: —the after the fact or post judgment types 
of considerations is not the focus of the Court. The focus of 
the parties is at the outset as it relates to the relationship, 
so that they can evaluate prior to the arbitration, period. 
MR. EPSTEIN: Exactly right, and that's what it is. 
I would just, you know, point out that sort of supplementing 
that, when you look at 78(b)-11-113, the Legislature has 
e x p r e s s e d i t s own ot : 
*-ut , i . -i l'i t r i t ' -
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I would also point out that the same statute, 11-113, 
also requites that there be a continuing obligation. I know 
the Court is going to hear, you know, from CPG that for a lot 
of reasons they weren't neutrals, they weren't intended to be 
neutrals. 
Let me point out one thing that maybe I think we 
didn't necessarily emphasize too much. One of the exhibits, 
the CPG's opposition, is a letter that Mr. Humphreys wrote to 
me, complaining and actually criticizing our provision to Judge 
Billings of a stack of pleadings from your Honor's case. 
Referring to it essentially as an improper ex parte 
communication, which certainly, and I'll be the first to 
acknowledge, would be — would be a prudent and probably 
proper observation — 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. EPSTEIN: — if the arbitrators are neutrals, as 
then I shouldn't have done that. We fixed it. We provided 
the same documents to everybody else. I mean, it turned out 
to be a non-issue, other than I think it is very telling, in 
the absence of a written pre-litigation agreement, what the 
parties or the lawyers, themselves, thought about this case. 
I stand — I stood corrected by Mr. Humphreys that we 
were to deal with them as we would if it was the triple A or 
some other jams, some other organization that had administered 
in these things, you know, and they were neutrals. 
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substantial relationship or professional relationship that 
would impair his neutrality in any form or fashion. 
MR. EPSTEIN: Well, but he's not the one that makes 
that decision. At the point of disclosure, the Code of 
Arbitration Ethics allows the — 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. EPSTEIN: — arbitrator to engage in that kind of 
an analysis after disclosure has been made, and after a party 
has raised a question about it. 
THE COURT: Right. I understand that. 
MR. EPSTEIN: Again, cart before the horse. 
THE COURT: I understand that. 
MR. EPSTEIN: He may very well have come to that 
conclusion, and we may very well have honored it, or not; 
but again, a party is going to look at this much differently 
than we lawyers might, you know, and believe that Richard 
Burbidge is, as I, you know, am sure he is. We've never 
made an accusation that Mr. Burbidge did anything untoward 
in connection with discharging his duties as an arbitrator, 
other than failing to make these disclosures. 
Aga.in, as the Court pointed out in its synopsis of the 
— of CPG's position, we've never used the undue means or fraud 
trigger under the -- under Section 125. We've never brought 
that up. That's not part of it. The only one that we've 
invoked is the evident partiality. That is only because in 
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Arbitration Ethics. 
THE COURT: Well, did a — by virtue of a strict 
diclosure — strict disclosure for requirements, would any 
companion arbitrators have a — also an arbitration as it 
relates to that? Well, if they knew, they would have to — 
I suspect they would let you know. 
MR. EPSTEIN: I think it's fair to say if they knew, 
they probably would have — they should have spoken as well. 
THE COURT: Okay, very well. Let's shift gears and go 
back to Rich Humphreys or Karra Porter now. 
MR. EPSTEIN: I think there's one other issue beyond 
the arbitration. They requested attorney's fees in connection 
with these proceedings. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. EPSTEIN; It would be just these proceedings. 
THE COURT: Well, if they prevailed, then they — 
MR. EPSTEIN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: -- let's go to that, because if they don't 
prevail — 
MR. EPSTEIN: But that's always — 
THE COURT: — of course it's moot; but if they do 
prevail, then let's go to your arguments in connection on that. 
MR. EPSTEIN: We really don't have one. I mean, under 
the UPUAA, both those statutes I believe are discretionary; but 
it's clear that under the arbitration code, if a motion to 
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**
ip**n 
. t fMl r ^ i t s a s s o c j a t e d w i t h t h - i t ? Does i t - i s t h e r e 
1 u p**'iii* :i* bd s i o apon w h i c h you c o u l d make some cLairo 111 
c o n n e c t i f * * •> t n b r e a c h of t 11 f« U t a h A c t ? 
Ml I'l "i I 1 I II I li 1 1 '" ippmt* ' ' r . l I 
Tv.cstion thai we've actually researched, becau.so we have 
mother case where piecisely that happened; hot a Court madp 
::inding of evide 111 partiality based upon the record .  Thera 
is no case law - -
THE COURT: Okay. '• • ' 
MR. EPSTEIN: that provides any relief or remedy to 
'
 j
.c agreeing person, 
THE COURT •' «.* t iiy;"^ t i igure out whether there 
«• * • .<" ig on the decision that 
1 •'• ma 10 
MR. EPSTEIN: There is not. We could find nothing that 
w o 113 d s u p p o r t a 11 a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e t r i p 1 e A 
THE COURT: Well, as U s u a1, it* s sort of the -
MH l-.T.'Tl, 1 I" 1'ifHi M refund or --
THK COURT * -e ol first impression bo lair Uu> 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
-34-
Court. 
MR. EPSTEIN: Yeah, but there was nothing to say it 
shouldn't. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EPSTEIN: It's just that it hadn't been done. 
What the statute says, though, is if you do vacate for evident 
impartiality, you order a rehearing. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. EPSTEIN: Okay, so it would, I mean, ostensibly 
go back — well, if it was a single member, the hearing would 
be before a new arbitrator. Presumably it would probably be 
before a new arbitration panel, because that would be the only 
way that one could extinguish any, you know, any suspicion. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. EPSTEIN: You know — 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EPSTEIN: — on what might have occurred. 
THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Humphreys, you need to 
be — remain right there, or you can come up to the podiura, 
whatever you feel most comfortable. 
MR. HUMPHREYS: If it's all right, I'll stay right 
here, since I have a number of things to juggle. Your Honor, 
first of all I would like to indicate that CPG, in its present 
motion, withdraws a Rule 54 certification. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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MR HUMPHREYS: The reason why is because it was 
:ticipated whe,n we tirst fiI.ed the in,otj on to confirm that 
of the matters pending re.ga.rdi ng the arbitration would be 
o] ved, ai id th< 
We h a v e ;,*•: : *. i iv_* Li;** - h i * . * , ^ r ; - » c u n 
t i c i s i o n s , and we * > J *• * p l i J i i N i s ie 
j q a r d i n g a t t o r n * \ * • ^ j d a j . ' s s i h i * a. l i t t l e 
e r , b u t a t t h e v+"**r ' W M H imp » t , * w.iulo r e -»•; 
it t i o n t h a t a„l ] r • 
j
 addressed at another time, whether the rooti on is denied or 
•anted, beca,use it is fi 11 ed wi th i ts own is sues and with its 
_ , _ factual findings a n d b a s i s .. 
THE COURT: Yes, sir 
I! II „, IB,UM,1: HRE Y S S • « j 1 , I: 1 „h < 1I n, J I 1! i „ • • „ i 1 1 h e in< : t i • > • :i 
•• o vacate, What I wou 1 d 1 ike to do i s bo i 1 I, t down, i f 1 
to what: wou,] d be the best ease, the bes t argument by C 
- * i)y Westgate, That i s th,at there was a duty to disclose, 
i I \ *11' in matter that shoii,'-' ten d.isc 1 osed and 
q i v ing these as assumptio • s. I • ' in :j;oi i Ig to a.d.dress 
i later t h i„ rd, i 11a• he pr es :Jmp t m was irre b ut table, and 
Mcrefore evidence req• 1i J i , . t i xth*?: t h^re was i n f act a,ny kind 
: i u b s t a n t i a. 1 o r spec i a 1 r e 1 a. t i o n s h i p i, s i r r e 1 e v a n, t. That i s 
what has to be assumed in order for Westgate to have its best 
:ase argument. 
The reason I say they have to have the rebuttable 
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-- the presumption irrebuttable, and that evidence of the 
substantial relationship is irrelevant, because they are 
arguing that. They are arguing that the mere failure to 
disclose is by itself a prima facie and irrebuttable, 
unrefutable case to vacate. That's their best argument. 
Now, I would like to suggest, your Honor, that the 
argument that they make is not correct, either by statute or 
by facta. Counsel was correct; the Legislature did envision 
the need to disclose. In fact, in Section 113 -- well, at 
78(b)-11-113 I'll just refer to the subsections from this 
point forward. 
In 113 it talks about disclosure by the arbitrators. 
Now, your Honor, I have a copy of this section of the code, 
which is critical. I'd be happy to give it to you, unless you 
have a copy. 
THE COURT: I don't have one before me, Counsel. 
MR. HUMPHREYS: May I give you a copy? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
MR. HUMPHREYS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: As long as you give one to opposing 
Counsel. 
MR. HUMPHREYS: I've done that. This is a remnant from 
a trip to Alaska last week. 
THE COURT: Oh. 
MR. HUMPHREYS: It will be off next week. All right, 
i u . > - » t .
 r tjit : h j t i i lu^' * Le : a s y . 
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; ' i i t • . 
i.-e i e t o r e t h e r e ' ti ^ i J ^ - ' *: » i" s rare- w h e t h e r ' h 
p i s e s *^ t f. ; r iVimpn* r x 3 r f r . *~ 
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by subsection (1) or (2) — we just read No, 1 — upon timely 
objection by a party, the Court, under subsection 124(1) (b) — 
THE COURT: May. 
MR. HUMPHREYS: -- may vacate. So now we have to 
understand why the issue is nmay" instead of "shall," because 
if, again, what they — what Westgate is arguing is true, that 
there is a non-disclosure, there was a duty to disclose, it 
was material, and there is a presumption that's irrebuttable, 
therefore why do we have a wmay vacate"? There is no reason 
for that; and that's why their argument fails. 
So now we have to get to what, then, does the 
Legislature give by way of guidance in terms of having the 
Court consider whether it may vacate. That is found in the 
following paragraph No. 5, subparagraph (5), an arbitrator 
appointed as a neutral, and I'll get to that in a minute. 
I'll assume for now that Mr. Burbidge is a neutral 
arbitrator. An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator 
who does not disclose a known, direct or material interest 
in the outcome of the arbitration, or a known, existing and 
substantial relationship with a party is presumed to act with 
evident partiality, and that it refers to 124(1) (b), which is 
the basis of their motion to vacate. 
Here there is a presumption. It is very clear law in 
Utah that a presumption is always rebuttable unless stated 
otherwise. Court's often refer to it as a balloon. That 
-39-
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with is evident partiality. This doesn't talk in terms of 
presumption; it talks only in terms of a finding by the Court 
of evident partiality. 
Before the Court, since Westgate has presented no 
evidence, is not alleging any evidence, yet now there is 
evidence before the Court in the form of an affidavit by 
George Burbidge that there is no basis to support the motion 
to vacate under Section 124. Now, for these reasons, your 
Honor, given their best argument, it fails; and therefore 
there cannot be a vacation of the award. 
Now, what I would like to talk about is going back to 
the duty to disclose, and say -- and address the assumptions. 
One was that there was a duty to disclose; and that is being 
assumed by Westgate in order to get to its conclusions, and 
I've assumed it-
Even if — but let's back up, and if we look at 
it carefully, we will see that there wasn't even a duty to 
disclose; because the duty to disclose under paragraph 1 has 
to do with facts that a reasonable person would consider likely 
to affect an impartiality. There are no facts presented where 
the likelihood can be deemed within a reasonable person's 
consideration. 
Therefore, there was not even a duty to disclose by — 
on the part of Mr. Burbidge, obviously. I think the situation, 
although Westgate wishes to portray the opposite inference, the 
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situation and the facts relating to it can be inferred the 
opposite. 
Richard Burbidge did not think there would have been 
any kind of relationship with George Burbidge, or he would have 
disclosed it. So an inference can be made that the fact that 
he didn't disclose it was an indication from him that he saw no 
likelihood of that first cousin relationship being a likelihood 
of affecting his partial — impartiality. 
Certainly the same on our part; if we would have ever 
suspected that there was any kind of a relationship between 
Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge, or anyone else on our 
firm, for that matter, we would have disclosed it. In fact, 
we would not have even appointed Richard Burbidge. So there's 
two sides of those inferences; and the presumption now fails 
once we're dealing in the evidence. 
So we would suggest the duty does not even arise 
on the part of Richard Burbidge, or arbitrator Burbidge, to 
even disclose, unless there is such a likelihood; and there 
is no such evidence. The same goes to a continuing obligation. 
There is no continuing obligation if you don't have 
the initial predicate, which is the likelihood of affecting 
impartiality. So we would also suggest, your Honor, that there 
wasn't even a duty to disclose; so that there's no basis at the 
outset for a vacation of the award. 
Now, there is some suggestion, and it's argued both 
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in (inaudible) and explicitly by Westgate, that if there 
was a non-disclosure, our client Westgate did not have the 
opportunity to consider the matter, and therefore that's the 
end. We have it vacated. 
The problem with that is the only remedy that Westgate 
had, had there been a duty, had there been a disclosure, was to 
object. Objection doesn't mean that arbitrator Burbidge cannot 
serve. There then must be a weighing of, okay, what is it? 
Is there a likely possibility — or excuse rae, a 
likelihood of impart -- well, let me get the right language 
— a likelihood that such a relationship would affect his 
impartiality? Then there would be a factual finding at that 
point in time; and if there wouldn't have been, we would have 
— even if there had been a disclosure and objection, we'd 
still be in the same situation we are today. 
So it is not a correct assumption. It's a giant leap 
over a gulf which cannot be made. To simply state, "Because 
it wasn't disclosed, therefore we vacate the award.'' We still 
must look at the merits, and that is exactly why subsection (4) 
under Section 13 -- 113 was put in by the Legislature. That 
is if there's not a disclosure, the Court may vacate, but 
there still has to be some kind of evidence of a special 
relationship. 
That is exactly what took place in the case that was 
addressed in the ethics opinion by the bar, where a Judge had a 
-43-
relationship of first cousin with the sheriff, and there was an 
issue raised that that — there should be a recusal. The bar 
made it very clear that first cousin alone is not sufficient to 
create a basis for recusal. 
In fact, if I can refer to that opinion, which is 
attached both I think to our memorandum in opposition to the 
motion to vacate, Exhibit 6, the bar stated, referring to the 
third-degree relationship, which this cousin relationship would 
be, but would not disqualify him if a cousin were a party or a 
lawyer to the proceeding. Then it goes on to say it would if a 
close personal relationship exists. 
Again, the focus isn't on a cousin relationship. It 
is on the close personal relationship. That's the — what the 
basis was in that case. Frankly, the standards applicable 
to Judges in motions to recuse seems to be far greater than 
standards that were applied to arbitrators. If it would apply 
such to Judge, it certainly would apply with greater force to 
an arbitrator. 
So we still -- no matter what happens, we get back 
to the central issue, was there a close personal relationship 
between George Burbidge and Richard Burbidge? There was not. 
The evidence is clear. There is nothing but a presumption, 
which is clearly now packed and behind us; and therefore 
there's no basis for a vacation. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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MR. HUMPHREYS: Now, if I may, your Honor, I'd like to 
address the Court's questions, unless you have questions about 
what I just argued? 
THE COURT: I don't, 
MR. HUMPHREYS: The Court has raised some questions, 
and I will now address, first of all, who won; what were the 
facts; how does — how does the Court interpret the arbitration 
award for purpose of determining prevailing party. 
Though this has been addressed, I think we need 
to maybe get a better focus on it. If you will look at the 
arbitration award, which is attached as exhibits to both memos, 
I think we have three different copies of that arbitration 
award attached. 
On page 4, the arbitrators state there were 208 
claimants -- claimant couples. They treat the couples 
collectively. Out of those 208, they found on page 8, 131 
had been actually injured, and they awarded the $500 for the 
lost trip, for each of the 131. 
Now, as Counsel correctly stated, the real fight in 
this case has always been liability. That's where all of the 
effort, and time, expense went into this, was establishing 
liability. 
All three arbitrators, including Judge Billings 
and Paul Felt — and by the way, even if we were to take 
Mr. Burbidge out of the picture, we still have a majority, 
-45-
including the arbitrator who was appointed by Westgate, who 
have determined that there was fraud, there was unlawful 
activity. 
They had gone very carefully in multiple page findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, and carefully outlined all of 
the facts that support each element of the unlawful pattern — 
excuse me, pattern of unlawful activity. They have — that was 
the major part of the battle. 
Now, the Court, I am sure, is raising the question on 
the — because both sides have asked for attorney's fees as it 
relates to this proceeding. Now, I think the Court needs to 
appreciate that the awarding of attorney's fees is a different 
basis here than it is in the arb — with the arbitrators. That 
has not been decided yet by the arbitrators. 
Now, the reason why is because the award is for the 
necessity of having to bring it to the Court and to create a 
judgment. It's not for the purpose of trying to figure out 
who did what in the underlying arbitration, and who won what 
and who — what defenses were won or lost, or what claims were. 
It has solely to do with the issue of does the winning 
party, which Westgate clearly was, as Counsel has conceded — 
MS. PORTER: CPG. 
MR. HUMPHREYS: — CPG — 
THE COURT: CPG. 
MR. HUMPHREYS: — clearly was, as Westgate's Counsel 
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has conceded, 
MR. EPSTEIN: I'll stipulate the other way. 
MS. PORTER: No. 
MR. EPSTEIN: (Inaudible). 
MR. HUMPHREYS: But CPG has had to bring the motion 
to confirm the award, because of non-payment; and that is the 
basis and the predicate for awarding of attorney's fees. It 
hasn't got anything to do with what amount was not paid or 
awarded by the arbitrators. That is an issue before the 
arbitrators when they decide how attorney's fees should be 
awarded in the underlying arbitration. 
Furthermore, I think it's important to point out, 
your Honor, that the percentage — well, CPG did not ask for 
punitive damages, nor double damages; and I'll explain why. 
We made it very clear to the arbitrators that the punitive 
damages had been awarded in the trail before this Court; and 
in that process there was consideration of many, if not all of 
the various claimants. 
Therefore it would be wrong to ask for double damages, 
which the statute allows for finding under the pattern of 
unlawful activity statute. It would be wrong to ask for double 
damages here, and yet claim punitive damages here in this — 
before this Court. 
So we told the arbitrators that CPG -was not seeking 
any punitive compensation or award at all in the arbitration 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
-47-
because of the punitive damage judgment here. So that's one 
reason — or that's another element the Court should consider. 
All right, let me now address some of the comments 
made by Counsel as it relates to the question the Court raised; 
Burbidge is not a common name, would a reasonable party invest-
igate or at least look at and make reasonable inquiry, was 
there an affirmative duty on Westgate? 
It's interesting that when Westgate argues that 
there was no such affirmative duty, they would — it would be 
unreasonable to suggest such a duty to discover; and why would 
anyone look at the letterhead to find that? I'm scratching my 
head saying, "Well, how did they find it?" They found it by 
looking at our letterhead after the award. 
It's very clear, Mr. Marder said that just before 
the motion for attorney's fees was heard, after the award had 
been made, and findings of fault and wrongful conduct had been 
made, he said, "The night before that hearing I happened to be 
looking at a letterhead and I saw Burbidge" -- or not the night 
before, within a few days before. 
So I contacted Mr. Humphreys. I wanted to know — I 
wasn't certain, so I contacted George Burbidge. I then emailed 
the night before and said there is — "They are cousins, but 
there's no relationship," and I spelled out some of the facts. 
Now, I'm scratching my head, saying, if there's no 
reason for them to look at it at the commencement. Why was 
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there a reason to look at it after the adverse finding? If 
there was — if it was so hard, and the assumptions were so 
clear that you wouldn't have to ever consider that there would 
be such a relationship because you assumed the party -- or 
the parties and/or the arbitrators were disclosed, I'm just 
scratching my head saying, *Well, then how did we get where we 
are?" Clearly they did have notice of the letterhead. 
When there is no indication at all by the parties 
about who they're going to be appointing and what relationship 
there is, I mean, heavens, I could have disclosed that I know 
Richard Burbidge, too. He's not a cousin. Have I been against 
him? Yes. Have I been with him? Yes. I've had cases with 
him, against him. Have I gone to lunch with him? Yes. 
Now, is that the kind of thing that I'm required 
under the statute to disclose? No, because that is the kind 
of relationship I have with all attorneys, including Mr. Felt 
and Judge Billings, though I hadn't ever been to lunch with 
her except during the arbitration, when we had lunch together. 
Everyone had lunch together, not just me. I need to make that 
clear. 
So I think that we're in a very different situation. 
Clearly Westgate had stipulated to the appointment by each 
party of one arbitrator. Now, I say-- let me give a background 
on that. In the order where the Judge granted their motion 
to arbitrate, we suggested to the Court, and we discussed 
-49-
1 I with Counsel that procedure of having each party select one 
2 I arbitrator, and have those two select a third. It was agreed 
3 I upon by both sides. 
4 I The Court didn't decide that out of the blue, and come 
5 I up with that. That was something that was discussed between 
6 I Counsel, and we both agreed. In fact, we designated our first 
7 I — our arbitrator first. The Court gave us 20 days in which to 
8 I do so. Westgate requested an extension of that, because who 
9 I they were looking at, which ended up being Judge Billings, was 
10 I out of town or something. We — 
11 MR. EPSTEIN: No, she was still serving. 
12 THE COURT: She was still serving. 
13 MR. HUMPHREYS: Oh, you're right. Yourre right. I --
14 I MR. EPSTEIN: She got continued over, because — 
15 MR. HUMPHREYS: There it is. 
16 I MR. EPSTEIN: -- you apparently — you may remember. I 
17 I hate to interrupt, but it — 
18 THE COURT: I do. 
1 9 I MR. EPSTEIN: - - was an i n t e r e s t i n g s t o r y , where her 
2 0 I replacement was r e j e c t e d . So she ended up having to work 
2 1 I overt ime, i f you w i l l . 
2 2 I MR. HUMPHREYS: That ' s r i g h t . 
2 3 THE COURT: My understanding — 
2 4 MR. EPSTEIN: T h a t ' s what i t was. 
2 5 THE COURT: — i t was r e j e c t e d by the - -
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MR. HUMPHREYS: You have refreshed my memory on it. 
THE COURT: — by the Senate, chosen by — 
MR. EPSTEIN: By the Senate. 
THE COURT: -- chosen by — selected by the Governor, 
but rejected ultimately by the Senate. 
MR. EPSTEIN: Exactly so. 
THE COURT: And a withdrawal. 
MR. EPSTEIN: And a very unusual scenario. 
MR. HUMPHREYS: Okay, so in any event, this was not a 
situation where the parties had not say in how the arbitrators 
would have been selected. 
Now, one final comment — oh, by the way, let me 
finish the questions the Judge raised. As it related to your 
recitation of the parties' positions and arguments, we're 
satisfied the Court accurately addressed those in preliminary 
statement. 
The Court during Westgate's argument raised the 
question of what about costs paid to the arbitrators? It 
may be worthwhile, your Honor, to note that each party has 
paid $75,000 to the arbitrators. Arbitration may be speedy, 
but it is not inexpensive. It was a huge expense for both 
sides to employ the three arbitrators, all of — all three 
of which charged I think a collective rate of $350 an hour. 
Now, maybe not all of that $150,000 has been used. I 
think the last accounting indicated there was approximately 
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20,000 that had not yet been used by the arbitrators, but still 
held in trust; but we still have pending matters. So we're not 
aure whether we're going to see anything or have a bill at the 
end for additional tine. 
Those are significant costs; but those costs are 
issues to be awarded and decided by the arbitrators, not this 
Court, again, because I think this Court is limited to the 
attorney's fees and expenses associated with that. 
THE COURT: I asked the question because potentially 
the issue of attorney's fees could exceed the award. Not — 
MR. HUMPHREYS: Right, that's — 
THE COURT: — you know, not the attorney's fees issue 
of the award, but could exceed the award; could it not? 
MR. HUMPRHEYS: You mean, before — 
THE COURT: I mean — 
MR. HUMPHREYS: — this Court or the arbitrators' 
attorney's fees? 
THE COURT: Between — before the arbitrators. I mean, 
if you each paid $75,000 to the arbitrators, and you get an 
award of $65,000. 
MR. HUMPHREYS: The costs alone will exceed the award. 
There's no doubt about that. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. HUMPHREYS: And the claim for attorney's fees, as 
Counsel has argued, is — 
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THE COURT: Still. 
MR. HUMPHREYS: — many times that amount. 
MR. EPSTEIN: Yes. 
MR. HUMPHREYS: That's not uncommon in civil rights 
cases. Oftentimes there's very little compensation, but the 
whole issue is attorney's fees, and the ultimate finding by 
the Court of whether there was a violation of civil rights or 
something such as that. So that's an not uncommon situation, 
but your observation is correct. 
All right, now on a final note, may I suggest this. 
Mestgate has made a big issue of the fact that arbitrator 
Burbidge was neutral — the, quote, "neutral arbitrator." 
All three were. In so arguing, they have used the general 
definition of neutral, meaning someone has -- is independent 
of everything, like a Judge would be in our case, or a jury 
would be in our case. 
The statute is not clear exactly what it meant by "the 
neutral arbitrator;" but the Section 112, which I also gave to 
the Court, does ref — again identify a neutral arbitrator in 
subsection (b). In subsection -- or did I — or should I say 
(2)? Let me look. Subsection (a) of 112 talks in terras of 
agreements and procedures, and what happens if there's no 
agreement and the Court has to decide. 
So -- but it doesn't define who the neutral arbitrator 
is; but it's very clear when you read the text of the statute. 
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that a neutral arbitrator is someone different. It's not any 
arbitrator. I think the only reading that makes any sense when 
you read it that way, or when you look at it, this issue, is 
that party appointed arbitrators aren't the neutral arbitrator. 
Only the — an arbitrator either chosen by the Court, chosen by 
the two Court appointed arbitrators, or if there'3 a procedure 
in place agreed in the agreement that outlines who it's going 
to be that's independent of the parties' choice, then that 
person becomes a neutral. 
So I think it is an improper assumption to say that 
every arbitrator is a neutral, or you get absurd results; 
because if that isn't the case, then by definition you are 
having arbitration awards by partial non-neutral arbitrators. 
That is not — you can't stretch the general definition of 
neutral, and apply it to everybody. 
There has to be a reason why they are using the word 
"neutral arbitrator." It's not so much a descriptive as it 
is a designating arbitrator, as a person who is not party 
appointed. That is the mechanism that is neutral. 
It is not necessarily the neutrality of the state of 
mind of the arbitrator, if you were to do it. Otherwise, every 
arbitration would be subject to attack, suggesting that they 
weren't neutral, or they were Court appoint — excuse me, party 
appointed. Therefore they had some tie with the plaintiffs, or 
the plaintiff's Counsel. 
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So I think a fair reading restricts the meaning of the 
statute to either Court appointed or a non-party appointed 
arbitrator as being the neutral. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HUMPHREYS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Epstein. 
MR. EPSTEIN: Thank you, your Honor. This is where 
the arbitrator's choice — if you want to call it a choice. I 
would more consider it their obligation — to invoke and abide 
by the triple A code of arbitration, arbitrator ethics, becomes 
much more important. 
As we pointed out, as the Court is aware, in the award 
itself, the arbitrators, all three of them, said they'd govern 
themselves by the Arbitrator Code of Ethics. What Mr. Humphreys 
just argued now underscores something that we really didn't 
argue at all. Maybe it was in a footnote, I think, that if in 
fact this is true, if in fact that because of the way the 
arbitrators were appointed, that Mr, Burbidge would not be 
considered a neutral, under the Utah Arbitration Act, that it 
is absolutely clear now, by virtue of Mr. Humphreys' construct 
that Mr. Burbidge has committed a serious offense and violation 
of the triple A Code of Arbitration Ethics. 
THE COURT: Well, so has your arbitrator, the one that 
you designated, simply by virtue of that — all he's saying is 
the neutrality issue is a designation -- a specific designation 
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interpretation 
THE COURT: Well, hopefully so; but the fact of the 
matter is that he — let me just state on the record. When 
you give parties an opportunity to select an arbitrator, okay, 
and that those two arbitrators are then going to designate a 
third, it may be someone that they've worked with before — 
MR. EPSTEIN: Sure. 
THE COURT: — they've had on panels before, they 
recognize their professionality, they recognize their back-
ground, they recognize their experience, they recognize perhaps 
their past judicial positions or appellate positions, or et 
cetera. So they take all of that into account. 
I don't think an arbitrator under those circumstances 
has to say, "Listen, for the last 15 years I have arbitrated 
the following cases in connection with attorneys out of that 
firm, and here are all of the decisions that have been made in 
I connection 
1 you know 
order to 
the part 
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of 
MR 
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THE COURT: Keep going. 
MR. EPSTEIN: No, I agree with you entirely. We're not 
saying anything different- Those kinds of relationships are 
inherent in the process --
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. EPSTEIN: -- and we're not suggesting that that has 
been a problem here at all. The only relationship that we're 
pointing to here --
THE COURT: Is the familial. 
MR. EPSTEIN: — is the familial one. So the fact that 
we knew one another, we assumed, and rightly so. I think all 
of us assumed that either Judge Billings or Richard Burbidge 
knew Paul Felt. Fine. We wouldn't expect that they — anybody 
would have a problem with it. I think we all know how that 
works, 
Here now is where all of this leads. The arbitrators 
themselves who now have charged themselves with knowledge of 
all of the provisions of the triple A Code of Arbitration 
Ethics now under Mr. Humphreys' construct, CPG's construct, 
now Mr. Burbidge must deal with Canon (I), Canon (I)(X)f which 
speaks precisely to this scenario. 
Sub (a), "In some types of arbitration in which there 
are three arbitrators, it is customary for each party acting 
alone to appoint one arbitrator. The third arbitrator is then 
appointed by agreement either of the parties, or of the two 
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1 I arbitrators," precisely what we have here, *or avail in such 
2 J agreement by an independent institution or individual," which 
3 I we didn't have. 
4 J "In tri-party arbitrations to which this covenant 
5 I applies," and it does apply because the arbitrators made 
6 I it apply, "all three arbitrators are presumed to be neutral 
7 I and are expected to observe the same standards as the third 
8 arbitrator," 
9 I So Mr. Burbidge under Mr. — under CPG's construct, 
10 I now must fit himself into this provision, which means that he 
11 I had the same obligation to make disclosures as Mr. Felt did. 
12 I Then I go on, me, "Notwithstanding this presumption, 
13 I there are certain types of tri-party arbitration in which it 
14 I is expected by all parties that the two arbitrators appointed 
15 j by the parties may be predisposed toward the party appointing 
16 I them. 
17 I "Those arbitrators referred to in this code as xCanon 
18 IX'" — Canon Roman Numeral X -- "'arbitrators are not to be held 
19 I to the standards of neutrality and independence applicable to 
20 I the other arbitrators. Canon X describes the special ethical 
21 I obligations of party appointed arbitrators who are not expected 
22 to meet the standard of neutrality." Now, we don't believe 
23 J that that occurred here, but that's Mr. (Inaudible) construct. 
24 J WC) A party appointed arbitrator has an obligation to 
25 I ascertain as early as possible, but not later than the first 
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meeting of the arbitrators and the parties, whether the parties 
have agreed that the party-appointed arbitrators will serve as 
neutrals, or whether they shall be subject to Canon X; and to 
provide a timely report of their conclusions to the parties and 
other arbitrators. 
Now --
THE COURT: Well, yeah, and we go back to the "required 
by an agreement to be neutral" language, right? 
MR. EPSTEIN: Well, in the fee agreement which preceded 
that first meeting, declared themselves to be neutral. Not 
party agree — arbitrators, but neutral in this sense of the 
word. So Mr. Burbidge — contrary to what CPG is arguing, 
Mr. Burbidge in fact did comply with the code of ethics by 
declaring himself to be neutral prior to the first meeting, 
the first scheduling conference that we had. 
So CPG's argument falls of its own weight, by virtue 
of what their own arbitrator in fact did. Mr. Burbidge had a 
choice. He had two paths. In the fee agreement he could have 
said, "I'm not a neutral --A> 
THE COURT: No, only — only part of their argument, 
not their entire argument. 
MR. EPSTEIN: No, no, no, the last part. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. EPSTEIN: The last part that Mr. — Mr. Humphreys 
had articulated. That last part falls of its own weight, 
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because if Mr. Burbidge was not going to be anything other than 
the classic archetypal neutral arbitrator, he had an obligation 
to inform the parties prior to the first scheduling conference 
that he would be subject to the Canon X disclosures, okay? 
Now, he didn't do that, so he's not subject to the 
Canon X disclosures. He's actually subject to the Canon I 
disclosures, which we've talked about a lot, which basically 
mirror the disclosures in Section 113 of the Utah arbitration 
code. 
Let's also look at what Canon X requires, because 
this is where the CPG argument again fails. "Canon X requires 
Canon X arbitrators are expected to observe all of the ethical 
obligations prescribed by this code, except those from which 
they are specifically excused; a) obligations of a Canon I. 
That's a disclosure. Canon X arbitrators should observe all 
of the obligations of Canon I subject only to the following 
provisions," and there's a couple of exceptions. 
Bottom line, it keeps referring back. In our view, 
Canon X arbitrators are still required to disclose what 
is involved in this case, even if they were a non-neutral 
arbitrator. Again, CPG's argument fails because Mr. Burbidge 
himself — 
THE COURT: Declared. 
MR. EPSTEIN: — excluded himself, declared himself 
to be a neutral arbitrator early on in the procedure, and 
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therefore subject to all of the provisions of the code, and 
also subject to the -- all of the provisions imposed upon a 
neutral arbitrator under the Utah Arbitration Act. 
Now, the primary thrust of CPG' s argument is that a 
reasonable person is not likely -- I don't want to rais-phrase 
this — that a reasonable person would not consider this 
familial relationship likely to affect the impartiality 
of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding. This is 
precisely why I made my observations at the beginning of this. 
Mr. Humphreys' argument is a greater argument by a 
great lawyer. It is not an argument that will be made by his 
client. His client would say, ^Wait a second. Are you out of 
your mind? This guy's cousin is in that firm over there, and 
he could possibly make money on this. I'd want to know that. 
I'm a reasonable client. I'm entitled to know that." 
We have to now take ourselves outside the shoes, you 
know, that we're wearing, you know, that are the byproduct of 
20 or 30 or longer years of being lawyers, and being skeptical, 
you know, and cynical about many -- too many things, and put 
ourselves in the shoes of a person who is just basically 
innocently believing that these proc -- that this process is 
not susceptible to these kinds of involvements, without them at 
least knowing about it. 
So I think we are missing the point of the statute 
by saying that -- just declaring as a matter of law that no 
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reasonable person would think this likely to affect the 
impartiality. 
The only way that one could ever determine whether it 
would likely affect the impartiality of the arbitrator is to 
do what Westgate was denied the ability to do; and that is to 
investigate before determining whether it was likely to affect 
the impartiality. 
Again, you draw the conclusion, and then you go back 
and sayr ^Because I've already drawn this conclusion, you no 
longer have the right to even ask the question." That's the 
flaw in the argument. Is it the same person, Richard Burbidge, 
is making the decision as to whether Westgate would be likely 
to consider this to be important, and then at the same time 
whether to disclose it in the first instance. 
You've got a self-contained little operation here. 
Is it the same person who has to make the disclosure, gets to 
decide whether to make the disclosure by determining them own 
— their own selves whether this is likely to be important to 
some other person who they most clearly are not. 
Nobody else has come in here and said -- other than 
Richard Burbidge — and said that nThis isn't likely to affect 
my impartiality." Mr. Burbidge is certainly not the reasonable 
person contemplated by the statute. The reasonable person 
contemplated by the statute is not a reasonable person serving 
as an arbitrator, but a reasonable person serving as a parti-
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cipant, as a party in the arbitration process. 
That's where their argument, again, fails of its 
own weight. They can't say that a reasonable party wouldn't 
consider this important. They're only saying that Richard 
Burbidge himself didn't consider it important, because -- I 
won't say he's estranged from his cousin, but certainly there 
seems to be elements of that. 
That's missing the point. He doesn't get to make that 
decision. The party gets to make that decision; and the party 
here was denied its absolute right under the statute to make 
that decision. It's a circular argument. 
It's a totality, in essence; and it completely guts 
the obligation to disclose, if you give the party who ha -- the 
arbitrator who has that obligation the right to evaluate the 
meaningfulness of the disclosure in the first instance. What's 
the point of disclosure if you're going to give the arbitrator 
the right to vet what they have to disclose? 
That totally renders the entire disclosure process 
meaningless, when it is always going to be through the filter 
of the arbitrator. This is unfiltered, unvarnished disclosure. 
Nothing in the code of ethics, nothing in the comments to the 
Uniform Arbitration Code, nothing suggests that there ought to 
be some sort of test applied by the arbitrator themselves as to 
whether this is worthy of disclosure or not, based upon their 
own view or vision. 
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THE COURT: That's what we do all the time. That's 
what Judges do all the time — 
MR. EPSTEIN: That's what Judges do. 
THE COURT: — as it relates to the issues of recusal. 
We make a threshold determination whether — and I always do 
it in terms of liberality relative to the issue of potential 
conflict, and bring it up. I don't care whether it's 25 or 30 
years ago. I brought one up two weeks ago that I represented 
this — this client on a collection case under $250 35 years 
ago. Now, parties can make a determination as it relates to 
that issue, and that's what they did. 
MR. EPSTEIN: Your Honor, if I may, and this is not 
intended to be impertinent, but you weren't told by one of the 
parties, "Wait a second, 35 years ago you represented me." You 
disclosed that to them. 
THE COURT: I did disclose it. 
MR. EPSTEIN: You brought it up. 
THE COURT: But — 
MR. EPSTEIN: That's the way it's supposed to work. 
THE COURT: Yeah, but let's say there was a failure 
to disclose as it related to that issue when we proceeded, 
and then there happened to be a judgment against one party or 
another, and someone determined at some stage that 35 years ago 
in private case I had a very minor case, a simple collection 
letter case in connection with one of the parties. Is that a 
-64-
basis upon which they can move to then set aside a judgment in 
the case, or a jury, or whatever it may be? My goodness. 
MR. EPSTEIN: The question is the reasonableness of 
the belief of the party that the Court was somehow biased or 
prejudiced or influenced by that fact. It's the reasonableness 
of that belief. You don't go back and question whether it is 
in fact true or not. 
Remember, when you're asked to recuse yourself, you're 
not making a determination of whether you are or not biased or 
prejudiced. You're making an evaluation about whether the 
party has made an adequate showing of a reasonable belief that 
the Court may be biased or prejudiced. That belief can only be 
established by knowing what the facts are. You're never going 
to put yourself in the shoes of the individual party, and say, 
MYour belief is unreasonable," you know. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EPSTEIN: You have to evaluate it from a different 
standard; and here --
THE COURT: Okay, let's just wrap up. 
MR. EPSTEIN: — that's not the standard. 
THE COURT: You followed up on my question. 
MR. EPSTEIN: Okay, let me just -- I've got my notes 
here. If I could make, you know, another comment. We're 
debating this issue of the letterhead. I think all of us fall 
into this — this little trap of kind of forgetting about how 
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we actually operate every single day, how much paper goes 
through our desk. 
The Court, you've told us before, there's no way, and 
you know there's no way, that you're looking at and studying 
every word on every page of every piece of paper that is in 
front of you. You know what's important, you know what is 
surplusage, you look at the important stuff, you (inaudible) . 
The fact of the matter is, Mr. Marder said it I think 
very well, he had never really looked at their letterhead, and 
he just happened to catch it, and see, wait a second, because 
we had such a huge volume of email, huge volume of email. Of 
course, that doesn't have any of that kind of specifics. I 
mean, it's not right or wrong. It just happens to be true. 
You know, I don't — I don't — you know, again, I 
think it's irrelevant, because it now presupposes there's 
some sort of duty to investigate, and some sort of inquiry 
notice, which we've already argued, I think, you know, I think 
very strenuously that there is none. That turns the whole 
disclosure process on its head; but again, that's the way it 
is in real life, and I think Rich can really appreciate that as 
well. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you, Counsel. 
MR. EPSTEIN: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: It's 10 minutes to 5. It's been a long 
day. I frankly had anticipated that I would announce the 
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decision from the bench today; but it involves an articulation 
relative to the issues of the applicable statutes, et cetera, 
in some great detail. The decision, frankly, may be appealed 
one way or the other, and I think it ought to be in writing. 
I'll do that within a period of 60 days. Nice to see you 
again, Counsel. 
MR. EPSTEIN: Always, your Honor. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Nice to — nice to have you here. 
9 (Hearing concluded) 
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statement of claim that i wiJI submit to them. You can then respond. We can then have a 
scheduling conference to determine dates and parameters of discovery. 
Sincerely yours, 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
L Rich Humpherys, 
Cc Richard D. Burbidge 
